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
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RUSSIA RELIEF

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SIXTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H. R. 9459 and H. R. 9548

FOR THE RELIEF OF THE DISTRESSED AND STARVING
PEOPLE OF RUSSIA

DECEMBER 13 AND 14, 1921

STATEMENTS OF

HON. JOSEPH W. FORDNEY
HON. JAMES P. GOODRICH MR. SAMUEL GOMPERS
DR. VERNON KELLOGG MR. RALPH SNYDER
HON. HERBERT C. HOOVER MR. CARL VROOMAN



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1921

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SIXTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION.

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JOHN JACOB ROGERS, Massachusetts.
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RUSSIA RELIEF.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Tuesday, December 13, 1921.

The committee this day met, Hon. Stephen G. Porter (*chairman*) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. The committee was called for the consideration of H. R. 9459, which is before you, entitled "A bill for the relief of the suffering people of Russia through the American Relief Association." Representative Fordney, of Michigan, is here and we would like very much to hear his statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH W. FORDNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

Mr. FORDNEY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have but very little to say. I introduced the bill because of the suggestion made by the President in his message to the House a week ago to-day. What information I have is to the effect that in this territory (in Russia the crops have failed and the people were starving in a great territory) formerly a very rich country, which is without a crop and without food for these people. As corn is at the present time selling on the market for 70 to 72 cents a bushel, it is thought that the \$10,000,000 limited by this bill would purchase, perhaps, 10,000,000 bushels of corn and 1,000,000 bushels of other grains for these people. Much of it is expected to be used in planting, to reproduce some crops in that territory.

(If relief is given it must be given in the next 90 days, or else it will come too late for them to use in producing more crops for the future.) Therefore I feel, as other gentlemen did that I consulted with, that if we do anything we should do it quickly, and this great rich country, in my opinion, can afford to do this and do it promptly and without a loss to our own people. If this has any effect on the market in the country it will have the effect of increasing values and therefore the people that produce grain who have been complaining of late that they have suffered because of this depression and decrease in values more than any other class of people in the country. If it benefits anybody it will benefit that class of people—the farmers of the country. As they constitute about one-third of our population, and perhaps the most important part of the population, because they produce the bread and butter for all the people, if it inures to their benefit, I think it is an advantage to our own people as well as the effect that this would have politically upon the whole world and especially the people of Russia. Therefore I would urge most earnestly that your committee give most earnest consideration and prompt action in the matter if you feel inclined as I do in the matter. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Mr. Fordney.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. GOODRICH, FORMERLY GOVERNOR
OF INDIANA.

The CHAIRMAN. Gov. Goodrich, of Indiana, is here, and I understand that he has just returned from Russia. We would like very much to have a statement from him.

Mr. GOODRICH. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, the chairman stated that I had just returned from Russia. I spent about two months there, going through the famine districts. I first went to Moscow, then out to Samara and down the Volga River to Saratov, then on down the river 30 miles below Saratov. I drove out in that lower Volga district to 16 different communes, going into the various communal houses, examining their records, going through

their grain houses, collecting all the statistics that I could get, to ascertain the true situation, I afterwards went out to Kazan, and from Moscow to Petrograd, covering pretty much all of the so-called famine district except the extreme lower part, and, perhaps, a part of it at the north end extending out toward the Siberian frontier.

To understand the real situation in Russia it is necessary to go back a bit because the famine is due to a number of contributing causes. In 1920 in all Russia they planted 76 per cent of the crop planted in 1916. In 1921 they planted 55 per cent of the 1916 crop. The major part of that decrease in the planting of crops in Russia occurred in the years 1918, 1919, and 1920, and the marked decrease in the last two years. There are several causes given for that, one the policy of requisitions, which cause is recognized by both Mr. Trotski and Mr. Lenin.

The other is due to the war that swept over this famine district, a civil war following four years of foreign war in which Russia was engaged. They had a partial crop shortage in 1920, due to two causes, a short planting, and to the failure of rainfall during that year. Then, in 1921, following the season of not to exceed a 55 per cent planting, came an almost total failure of rainfall. The rainfall in May, June, and July was less than 10 per cent of the normal rainfall, and the normal rainfall in that country is rather short. So that had there been a normal crop planting in 1921 in that part of Russia from the Tartar Republic on down to the Caspian Sea, still they would have had a tremendous grain shortage in the lower Volga country.

On my return to Moscow after my first trip, I went to the commissar of agriculture and asked him to prepare me certain statistics, which I afterwards got on my return there, and in going to the capitals of the various States I went to the commissar of agriculture to get what facts I could obtain there, and then went into the commune and got the communal records, which are very complete in most of these Russian communes, especially so in what is known as the German-Russian commune in the lower part of the Volga Valley. Those records are very complete and accurate in the Tartar Republic. Other places have kept their records with more or less accuracy, so the conclusion I arrived at was made up on this information obtained from the commissars of agriculture at Moscow, and from the commissars of the various States. By checking that back with the records of the local communes, I think that the information I have is reasonably accurate.

Later on, if the committee so desires, I will file and make a part of the record these various tables and statistics that I have prepared touching this famine.

The CHAIRMAN: We would like very much for you to leave those, if you will, Governor, so that we can incorporate them in the record.

Mr. GOODRICH: I will put these in in order so that you may have them included.

I do not know how hard this famine hit the country but we must realize something of the general conditions of the lower Volga Valley. This famine district is, perhaps, the most densely populated in the world outside of China dependent wholly upon agriculture. They have no industrial background, no manufacturing centers, as the industries of Russia very largely disappeared in the last three or four years and the people must depend almost wholly on the products of the soil. And so we find extending from Kazan to Samara a population running above 100 to the square mile. That is four times the population of my own State of Indiana, depending on agriculture alone, and when you eliminate the waste land in these provinces, or rather the communes or collections of communes, I found 150, 170, and even 190 to the square mile, so that you can understand something about the situation from the population viewpoint.

In going into the German and Russian communes and the Russian communes in the lower Volga I found an appalling situation. On going into the cities and observing these great, strong, round-faced, red-cheeked men and women in the bazaars and on the streets, one would think there was no famine in that country, but when you go into the community houses where deserted children and orphans are assembled, go out into the communes and into the communal homes where they have gotten them together, you realize how terrific the situation is, especially when you get down to the brass-tack facts and see the small amount of food that they have there upon which they must depend to sustain life for the next six months.

Let me give you two typical communes. I do not select them because of their unusual character but they are typical of the communes on the lower

Volga. First the commune of Schilling. It is a German commune with a population of 3,798. With 3,795 dessiatines plowed lands and 872 dessiatines of pasture lands, or a total of 4,467 dessiatines, or $1\frac{1}{2}$ dessiatines per capita, which is 34 or 34 acres to the inhabitant in that little commune. They planted in 1919, 1,500 dessiatines of land that yielded 37,350 poods of grain, of which the Government took 12,000 in taxes that year. In 1920 they planted 1,737 dessiatines, a little bit more than in 1919, and raised 30,533 poods. They had that year almost a failure of wheat. The wheat crop dropped from 22,888 to 4,646 poods. There was a partial drought in 1920, but their potato crop increased from 7,000 to 19,800 poods and that kept them alive that year.

Mr. COXWELL: Will you tell us how much that pood is?

Mr. GOODRICH: A pood is 36 pounds. The Government that year took 5,000 poods, or 40 per cent of what they did the year before. In 1921 they planted 1,255 dessiatines, about 20 per cent less than in 1920. Of the 1,255 dessiatines they did not get back the seed used to plant the crops. I went through their grain houses. They had 11 communal grain houses that are usually filled with grain and 9 of them were empty without a pound in them, and the other 2 were partially filled. I met there a pretty clean looking lot of farmers, Russian farmers assembled in the communal hall. By the way, this year the Government did not tax them at all but instead of that gave them back enough seed to sow 330 dessiatines of rye, so that they paid no tax at all this year, and they have there plowed ready for next year 800 dessiatines of ground ready to sow in wheat if they can get the seed to sow.

7.50 the crop this year compared to 1919 was only about 6 per cent, and compared to 1920 about 7 per cent. They had that much available footstuffs in the commune to preserve the lives of 3,798 people. There are not that many now, because a great many of them have already died, but they have only about 13 poods per capita, including their cabbage and everything they use there. They gave me the reports recently, and since the 1st day of July 25 died from cholera, 30 from typhus, and 45 from starvation. They said that in that little commune they have 1,146 children under 15 years of age. They said that at least 800 of them would have to have help or die of starvation before next spring.

It was my opinion from the serious expression on the faces of these farmers that they believed that they were telling the truth. They said that the Government had promised them seed and they were in hopes that they would get this. This commune and all others told me that if they had enough grain to sow their wheat next spring they could get along without any help after next harvest. The Russian commune of Babaroff, 10 versts from Schilling, was next visited. It has 2,816 people and 3,100 dessiatines of land, about the same proportion as Schilling. They planted rye, oats, wheat, and potatoes, and other crops in 1919 on 1,200 dessiatines and harvested 4,260 poods; in 1920 on 1,625 dessiatines they harvested 3,021 poods; in 1921 they planted 1,100 dessiatines and got 1,400 poods of grain. I went into their warehouses, and out of nine warehouses eight of them were empty, and they had surplus grain stored in one warehouse. Those communes are typical.

I went over to the commune of Norda, which has 21,000 dessiatines of land, with a population of 8,500, and is said to be the richest of the communes in the whole Volga Valley. It is made up of Germans who came to Russia under Catherine the Great and have maintained their customs and cultivated the land in an efficient way. They have an unusually large amount of land, because five years ago they bought 5,000 dessiatines extra and paid for it out of their communal earnings, so they have there two and a half dessiatines per capita, which is rather unusual for Russia. The population in that commune is only 96 to the square mile, and Schilling is 190 to the square mile. In the commune of Norda they raised 10,650 poods of grain on 21,000 dessiatines of land, and with that they must feed and take care of 8,500 people. Between that commune and the commune of Schilling I saw in one field as I went by grandparents—I judged so by their appearance, and afterwards learned that was true—the grandfather and grandmother and the son and the daughter-in-law and five children, who were on their knees going across their little allotment of land gathering every weed they could get, tying them in bundles, hauling them down to their commune, and there they intended to thrash out the weed seeds and grind them in the communal mill, mix with rye, and try to get along. The straw from the weeds they put in stacks that their stock might eat it to keep them alive until the next harvest. I asked them whether or not the stock would eat it, and they said, "They will not until everything else is gone, but

they will eat it before they will starve to death." I saw children out along the little waterways gathering rose pods, cuckoo burrs, and things like that in little bags that they would take home to grind in their little communal mills, which they have everywhere.

In that commune were 145 people starved to death this year, 65 died from typhus, which is just getting under way there, and 82 from cholera.

I had heard these reports, from different communes, of people starving, and I knew they had food enough to prevent starving for the time being. I said to these folks, there were 20 or 30 in the communal hall, "I wish you would tell me why it is that where there is enough to preserve life for all of you for several months that you permit your neighbors to starve to death." One peasant answered the question rather slowly. He said, "You Americans do not understand. There is not enough to keep us all alive until next harvest. If we divide up now and do not get help, we will all starve to death. It is better that some shall die in order that others might live." That was his philosophy. He told me they had had a good bit of experience in 1891, when 300,000 died of starvation in the Volga Valley. But at any rate that was the answer, not easy for Americans to understand, but yet when you get inside of Russian life and understand the terrific situation that confronts those people you cease to wonder why, knowing that death must overtake them all if they divide, that they choose to preserve their own families. They are making every preparation to meet the situation. Perhaps they will discount any figures we get, because the human being has a tremendous capacity to maintain life under adverse conditions.

In the commune of Houk, 20 versts beyond Markstadt, we found the communal kitchen in operation. They serve one meal a day at the noon hour, giving to those who have no food three ladles of soup made from cabbage, carrots, and other vegetables, with some meat in it; also about half a pound of rye bread. We saw no evidences of starvation at the communal hall or about the center of the commune. We visited the communal home, where orphans and abandoned children are collected from the nearby communes. We found 145 children in this home. They are first taken into one part of the home, deloused, and given a bath. These children when they come in are dirty, ragged, living skeletons, with a helpless, hungry look in their faces, and take little or no interest in their surroundings. They seem more like an animal that has been shot to death and crawled off in the brush to die. It was a terrific sight for an American to witness. After the children are cleaned up they are given rough cotton clothing, very scant and light, most of them without shoes and stockings, although the thermometer on the day we were there was 28° below zero and the home in which they were quartered not very well heated on account of the shortage of fuel.

I found in this commune 41 houses which had been abandoned. The owners had either died or left the commune. The roofs had been torn off these houses to get wood for fuel. Fuel is very scarce in that country, for the lower Volga is almost as devoid of timber as western Kansas. They burn manure, which is made up in small blocks, and some peat. On the outskirts of this commune, Houk, as we passed a small shed near one of the abandoned houses we found in it two little girls, 10 and 12 years of age. They came out of the shed holding their arms close about them, shivering and crying in the cold, bitter wind blowing the snow across the commune that day. I inquired as to their trouble. They said that their father and mother and two of their brothers had died of cholera and starvation the week before.

That for the past five days they had nothing to eat except some cabbage leaves and carrots that they had gathered from about the commune. They were barefooted and had on no clothing except thin cotton dresses extending to their knees. They said that they were very hungry. They looked as if they were in great distress, were exceedingly thin and emaciated.

I asked them why they did not go to the communal authorities and apply for help at the communal feeding kitchen. They answered that they did not think it would be any use; that they understood that there was not food enough in the commune for every one. We gave them 100,000 rubles each and told them to go to the communal hall, where they would be taken care of, and they did so. These children probably would have starved to death had we not found them. I asked the communal officers why they did not hunt these cases up. They did not give a very good excuse. They said the cases of hunger usually were called to their attention and that they had all they could do with the limited supply at their command to care for those who came to them.

I tell you these things in order that you might get some idea as to the things that are happening in Russia. I went into a peasant's home in the province of Saratov, where a man and woman were lying at the point of death. They had had nothing to eat for over a week, no money to get anything with. They said "there is no hope for us; we are too weak to get out; we shall die but it does not matter." Many stories of this kind are being told you of the things we saw and heard throughout the famine district. It is difficult for Americans to understand this situation. In these same communes where the terrible conditions I relate occur, a great majority of the people have sufficient to eat and are at this time living in comparative comfort.

Mr. TEMPLE. May I ask one question?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. TEMPLE. You spoke of giving these little girls 100,000 rubles apiece. What was the value of that money? How many meals would that buy?

Mr. GOODRICH. Quite a great many, because you could get rather a good meal in Russia for 5 to 10 cents American. The rate of exchange, perhaps \$1 for 100,000 rubles.

Mr. SARATH. You could get 100,000 rubles? Yes; for \$1.

Mr. GOODRICH. You could get a very good meal in Saratov, consisting of soup, bread and butter, and tea, for 7 cents, including the tip.

Mr. SARATH. What is 1,000 rubles worth—about a cent or less?

Mr. GOODRICH. One hundred thousand rubles is worth a dollar.

Mr. SARATH. Then 1,000 would be worth one-hundredth of that?

Mr. GOODRICH. A cent; yes.

Mr. LINDBERGER. Do you anticipate the possible delivery of this grain to those for whom it is intended without the interference of the authorities?

Mr. GOODRICH. No question about that.

Mr. LINDBERGER. You have their full cooperation?

Mr. GOODRICH. Absolutely. The Soviet Government, whatever you may say or think about it, is cooperating to the fullest extent. It will not permit a pound of the food to be diverted, but is carrying it to its destination without loss. It is the death penalty for anyone to steal food from the American Relief Administration. I heard a man tell the American Relief Administration officers at Saratov that if anyone stole anything not to fool with them but to report them, and that anyone found stealing American food would be stood up against a wall and shot. There has been a remarkably small amount of food lost. They have an organization down in all those places.

Mr. SARATH. Whom do you mean by "they"?

Mr. GOODRICH. The American Relief Administration. I talked to the different communal officers. They will drive 40 or 50 versts across the country and haul the food out and distribute it to the kitchens, and every pound of food will go to the mouths of the hungry people in Russia.

Mr. LINDBERGER. Do they have the same idea about the survival of some, with the perishing of others, or do they feel that the food should be for general distribution?

Mr. GOODRICH. No; the food now being sent is used only for children. They are doing the best they can under tremendously difficult conditions.

Mr. COCKRAN. Speaking of the people or of the Government?

Mr. GOODRICH. The people, and the Government is doing the best it can.

Mr. CONNALLY. Is the Government taking any measures now to relieve this condition?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONNALLY. Supplying them with grain and food?

Mr. GOODRICH. Doing that to some extent; yes.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. To as full an extent as they can?

Mr. GOODRICH. I think so.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. There is \$10,000,000 in this proposed appropriation. With that would you be able to save the lives of all those in that condition?

Mr. GOODRICH. No, sir; I do not think it is enough, gentlemen. It ought to be doubled. It ought to be 20,000,000 bushels of corn, and 5,000,000 bushels of wheat sent over from this country to save that situation.

Mr. COCKRAN. Would even that be enough?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. COCKRAN. When you say it should be double that, do you think that would be sufficient to supply and give the means of sustaining them next winter?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes; if they know this is coming from America. They know they can trust America; then they will divide up and take care of those people as soon as they know help is coming. But they should know it pretty quick. People are dying over there every day from starvation.

Mr. COCKRAN. What part of the country are you speaking of?

Mr. GOODRICH. The lower Volga Valley.

Mr. COCKRAN. In the other portions are they supplied with the necessities of life?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. In the lower Volga, Kazan, or Samara, down?

Mr. GOODRICH. From Kazan, in the Tartar Republic, to the extreme north.

Mr. BURTON. They are suffering there in the Tartar Republic?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. You went that far below Saratov?

Mr. GOODRICH. Down to Astrakhan. It is thinly populated—only about 16 to the square mile.

Mr. BURTON. In the district below Saratov it is not so thickly populated. Did you go to Tsaritsyn?

Mr. GOODRICH. No.

Mr. BURTON. You went clear to Astrakhan?

Mr. GOODRICH. I did not, sir. I relied on what Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Golder told me as to that part of it.

Mr. BURTON. Did you make your investigation on the east or west side of the Volga?

Mr. GOODRICH. Both.

Mr. BURTON. You went to both sides?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. How great a distance from the river?

Mr. GOODRICH. The famine district does not extend to exceed 75 miles on either side of the river.

Mr. BURTON. When you get beyond that, do I understand that they have supplies of grain?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes, sir. Take the Province of Penza, which extends from Saratov to Samara, they have enough to go through until next harvest.

Mr. BURTON. But they have no surplus supplies?

Mr. GOODRICH. No, sir; the Russian Government exempted from all taxation what was called the famine provinces, the provinces of not sufficient food, and of course, every province in Russia is seeking to get into that class. They would not have to be taxed if so classified. Penza was not accorded that status.

Mr. BURTON. You spoke of an appropriation by the Government. What we send over there is not going to be appropriated by the Russian Government for military purposes or anything else?

Mr. GOODRICH. I am certain it will not be.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give me an approximate idea of the extent of the famine area in acres?

Mr. GOODRICH. Taking all of the provinces in order, there are 10 to 14. If it extends only to 10 provinces, that is perhaps 18,000,000 people, and 14 provinces would be 25,000,000 people affected by it. I do not mean those 25,000,000 are all destitute, because over there they have people who are more prosperous than others, as well as we do here. But it affects that many people.

The CHAIRMAN. Have the adjoining provinces done anything to aid the famine section?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes; there has been food sent in from what are called the Provinces of sufficient food. These food kitchens that I told you about in those various communes are situated in the cities and food is sent in by the Government.

Mr. SABATH. Our Government?

Mr. GOODRICH. No, sir; the Russian Government. They have contributed rice for all the land that has been sowed in the famine districts, because they raised nothing down there, or practically nothing—less than 5 per cent of a crop.

Mr. BURTON. Are there any provinces in which there is any considerable surplus of food?

Mr. GOODRICH. The Ukraine, and in Siberia and western Russia. In the Ukraine and Siberia there is a surplus of more than 150,000,000 of poods. Moscow and Petrograd and the northern part of Russia has never raised enough food

to supply itself and must draw from the other provinces to take care of that part of Russia.

Mr. BURTON. You are speaking of the conditions in Moscow and Petrograd? What are they?

Mr. GOODRICH. The American Relief Association feeds children in both Moscow and Petrograd. The Government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, took out of the Volga districts the abandoned and orphan children and sent a great many of them into Moscow and into Petrograd, several thousand came from the Tartar Republic, as they had many vacant and available buildings in Petrograd to take care of them.

Mr. BURTON. We heard a great deal about the breakdown of transportation in Russia. By what means would this relief be taken to the famine-stricken region?

Mr. GOODRICH. I had a conference with the commissar of railroads two days before I left and went over the whole situation with him. If you can rely on the reports of the British commissioner, appointed a year ago, he has over 1,200 more engines now than one year ago, 8,626 engines in good running order; 7,000 engines needing light repairs, and 6,000 engines needing heavy repairs. The Russian Government has bought 850 engines from Germany and 1,000 from Sweden. They are being delivered now. They have 440,000 freight cars in good order and 110,000 in bad order, that need light repairs, 23 per cent, a rather heavy proportion. There is no question but that they can move the freight and move it quickly. The commissar says that he can, and I am certain he is right.

Mr. BURTON. You rode over some of these railroads?

Mr. GOODRICH. About all of them.

Mr. BURTON. From Petrograd to Moscow and Moscow to Samara?

Mr. GOODRICH. Samara to Moscow and Kazan to Moscow and Saratov.

Mr. BURTON. Are boats running now on the Volga River?

Mr. GOODRICH. Not now. Navigation closed before I left.

Mr. BURTON. You were there, too?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. They were running then?

Mr. GOODRICH. Fifty-one boats were in the harbor of Saratov when we were there.

Mr. LINDBERGER. You say there are eighteen to twenty-five million people without food? How many thousand square miles would you say?

Mr. GOODRICH. I can not give you the population of those per square mile—of those various provinces.

Mr. LINDBERGER. Just roughly, the number of square miles in the area affected?

Mr. GOODRICH. I could not say that, because I would have to figure it backwards from the population. The province of Samara is about one-half the size of the State of Indiana. It has nearly the same population.

Mr. LINDBERGER. You say that \$20,000,000 would cover it, that it should be more than this amount?

Mr. GOODRICH. I said 20,000,000 bushels.

Mr. LINDBERGER. But you told us if there is an appropriation of \$10,000,000 that would be needed to cover the purpose?

Mr. GOODRICH. No, sir; I did not. That was Mr. Fordney. But you can buy pretty good American corn for 50 cents a bushel, can you not, Mr. Hoover?

Mr. HOOPER. You can buy corn at the seaboard for 55 cents to 60 cents.

Mr. COCKRAN. About how much money would be necessary to meet the conditions over there, to avoid starvation of children and supply enough to meet the supreme necessities of the famine?

Mr. GOODRICH. You speak about starvation of children. I am talking about the whole population.

Mr. COCKRAN. I am speaking of the whole population.

Mr. GOODRICH. I think if the President had at his disposal \$20,000,000 it might be done.

Mr. COCKRAN. Is that the result of careful calculation or just a rough estimate laid down?

Mr. GOODRICH. It is the result of the investigation I made, from a comparison of statistics obtained from the commissar of agriculture at Moscow, from the commissars of the various provinces I visited, from the records I obtained in

the various communes visited, and from reports received from Dr. Hutchinson and others who have gone over the district. I took all these facts into consideration in arriving at a conclusion.

The commissar of agriculture at Moscow states that they must have 30,000,000 bushels of grain outside of what they possibly can furnish themselves in order to sow the amount of wheat, oats and barley they sowed last year.

To sow all the ground they have prepared ready for seedling would require more than this.

Mr. COCKRAN. If this amount was appropriated, to be at the disposition of the President, to avert at least starvation there, would it be enough to set the wheels of industry going from agriculture up? In that crucial condition they ought to have enough now.

Mr. GOODRICH. That involves the industrial and political situation in Russia, and I would rather discuss that in executive session. There are some indications now of the revival of industry in Russia.

Mr. COCKRAN. What I was getting at is this: If this was an appropriation of \$20,000,000, would that in your judgment be sufficient to start the agricultural life in Russia in such a wholesome condition as to revive the conditions?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes. There is every indication that Russia next year will raise an extraordinary crop per acre. They have a large acreage of rye sowed that looks extraordinarily good.

If you please, I am addressing myself to what is necessary to do to save human life and prevent people in Russia from starving to death because of the lack of food. If you furnish enough to enable them to plant all the ground they have sowed, ready for planting, Russia will, with a normal rainfall, have a surplus of foodstuffs next year. To put Russia on its feet industrially is a different proposition.

Mr. COCKRAN. As I understand, you are taking up two aspects of the question, first, to save and relieve from immediate starvation or prospect of starvation, and, secondly, there is the matter of giving Russia a chance to be saved from starvation in the future?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes.

Mr. COCKRAN. How much would it take, in your judgment, to meet the necessities, the immediate necessities, to avert starvation?

Mr. GOODRICH. Twenty million bushels of corn, not to exceed 5,000,000 bushels of wheat, might bring that about.

Mr. COCKRAN. That would be \$10,000,000.

Mr. GOODRICH. It would be more than that.

Mr. COCKRAN. How much?

Mr. GOODRICH. Five million bushels of wheat would cost \$6,000,000 to \$8,000,000. It would take \$15,000,000 to \$20,000,000.

Mr. COCKRAN. When you take a sum of \$20,000,000, that would more than provide for the immediate necessities?

Mr. GOODRICH. No; it will enable them to raise a crop next year to take care of themselves.

Mr. COCKRAN. You think \$20,000,000 would be enough to furnish them with the means of starting the industries next year, with agriculture?

Mr. GOODRICH. There is no doubt but that it will.

Mr. BURTON. Not as expressing any opinion of mine, to meet possible opposition to the appropriation, photographs brought out of Russia, even in those famine-stricken regions, show the draft horses, etc., fat and in good condition. What do you say about that?

Mr. GOODRICH. That is true in some places, and in some it is not. There are fat horses, draft horses, plenty of them in Russia. Down in the worst of these districts I did not see any fat horses.

Mr. BURTON. How about the stock of those famine-stricken regions?

Mr. GOODRICH. The sheep look exceptionally good. They are heavy sheep raisers in Russia. They graze the sheep on the communal fallow-land plan. They cultivate one-third of the land each year, following the old, antiquated method of the three-year system, cultivating one and lying fallow two years.

Mr. BURTON. Do I understand there is an abundance of sheep in those regions where so much assistance is needed?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Why do they not kill them for food?

Mr. GOODRICH. Let me give you the shortage of animals. It is typical. In 1919 the Schilling commune had 1,223 horses, in 1920 it had 891 horses, and in 1921 it had 451 horses. It had of cows 582 in 1919, 401 in 1920, and 413 in 1921. You notice there the cows decreased in number but little, as they need the milk to keep the children alive. Of sheep they had 1,352 in 1919; they had 1,151 in 1920, and they had 424 sheep in 1921. That shows a decrease of 60 per cent of sheep. Of pigs they had 781 in 1919, 246 in 1920, and 58 in 1921. That is a decrease of 92 per cent in pigs. That tells the story without comment.

Mr. BURTON. Is the pasturage such that the sheep and cattle are well maintained, notwithstanding the drought?

Mr. GOODRICH. The sheep especially do well, because sheep will live and keep fat where nothing else will.

Mr. COCKRAN. How do you account for that decline in the number?

Mr. GOODRICH. The partial crop failure last year and the total failure this year. In Saratov they are killing them off because they knew the time will come when they can not feed them.

Mr. COCKRAN. That explains it.

Mr. GOODRICH. Part of the animal or stock shortage is due to the civil war that swept over this land.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. What in your opinion will be accomplished by the provisions of this bill if there is no appropriation greater than made in the bill?

Mr. GOODRICH. It will help enormously and save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. It will enable them to sow much of the ground already prepared for seedling. I have not touched on the corn-seedling question.

The commissars of agriculture in the Volga in recent years have been endeavoring, with little success, to induce the planting of corn. The density of population makes the raising of the largest possible food values essential.

The experiments made show more food values of corn can be raised per acre than of any other crop.

Taking advantage of the unusual condition, they hope to induce the planting of several million acres of corn on ground already prepared, but for which seed wheat can not be procured.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. Did I understand you to say a little while ago that this appropriation would carry them over until the new crop, with the addition of enough to allow them to divide food between themselves?

Mr. GOODRICH. Ten million bushels.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. Yes.

Mr. GOODRICH. I do not want to say that it will not. My judgment is that it is not enough. It will help greatly. If they get seed enough to sow half of the ground they have ready to seed, they will get through next year unless they have another drought or total failure of rainfall. They have never had that three years in succession.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. Would you say to the provision for seed grain? Is that sufficient in the bill?

Mr. GOODRICH. I do not think so, no; in my opinion it ought to go further.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. How much further?

Mr. GOODRICH. I think it ought to be in the neighborhood of 5,000,000 bushels for seed purposes.

Mr. SARATOV. Are they not also short in rye? That would be needed.

Mr. GOODRICH. That has been sowed. They have sowed enough rye if they have anything like a normal harvest next year, if they get some wheat to carry them through. Of course, they have a shortage of rye now. Russia never exported much rye, but what they sold was wheat, oats, and barley. The significant thing is that the statistics show the greatest decrease in crops there has been in wheat, oats and barley; in what they sold and did not eat. I did not say they did not eat any of it, but they sold the surplus.

Mr. LINDBERGER. Are the Russians exporting any foodstuffs to foreign countries?

Mr. GOODRICH. No. They are importing. I saw at Petrograd a cargo of 100,000 bushels of American wheat being unloaded there that the Government had bought through Sweden, because we were not trading with them.

Mr. COCKRAN. How do they distribute it?

Mr. GOODRICH. I do not know how they distribute it there after it is unloaded. I will give you the figures for all Russia. I will give you the per cent of failure, comparing 1912 and 1920 and 1921. In winter rye they sowed in 1921

70 per cent of the 1912 crop; spring rye, 50 per cent. Of winter wheat and spring wheat and oats and barley—those crops they sell—dropped to 45 and 38 per cent. Russia does not export much of the rye.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you get the figures upon which you base that calculation?

Mr. GOODRICH. I got those from the commissar of agriculture and checked them back with the reports of the Tartar Republic and the German communes. So I believe them to be accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe these to be accurate?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes. I went into the communal records. I had George Repp, a Russian-Jordan, from Portland, Oreg., and we took the records themselves and checked the data, and I think they are accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. You are satisfied in your own mind that they are reasonably accurate?

Mr. GOODRICH. I am.

Mr. BROWNE. How many constituted your party that made these investigations?

Mr. GOODRICH. There were several different parties. Part of the time just a little time I was alone, and part of the time I was with Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Golder, and part of the time with George Repp; most of the time with him. I was part of the time with Philip Gibbs and part of the time with Col. Haskell at Petrograd.

Mr. BROWNE. Under whose auspices did your party go?

Mr. GOODRICH. I went over at the request of Mr. Hoover.

The CHAIRMAN. What official position do you hold with the American Relief Administration?

Mr. GOODRICH. None whatever.

Mr. COCKRAN. I was not here at first, and I will ask you a few questions. Do I understand that your position is that \$20,000,000 with that starving population in Russia will be enough to afford the means of resuming its agriculture? Is that an exaggeration or not?

Mr. GOODRICH. It will enable those people to raise enough foodstuffs to carry them through the next year without any outside help.

Mr. COCKRAN. That means that it will enable them to tide them over by their own means?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes; surely.

Mr. COCKRAN. What do you think of \$20,000,000? Is that enough?

Mr. GOODRICH. I think so.

Mr. COCKRAN. Do you think it could be done for less than that?

Mr. GOODRICH. I do not think that it could be done for less than that. I think the President ought to have authority to do it, and he can be governed by the latest information and by what the Government itself does and what they are able to sell. You would not want, and I should regret to see, this country start in and not do the job right because of the lack of two or three million dollars.

Mr. COCKRAN. As I understand, there is a considerable quantity of autumn rye and of autumn wheat, fall rye, and fall wheat, already planted.

Mr. GOODRICH. Scarcely any fall wheat, because they do not sow much of it; winter rye, yes.

Mr. COCKRAN. Mostly spring wheat?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes.

Mr. COCKRAN. Winter rye is planted in some considerable volume?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. COCKRAN. And that rye is in the worst regions of famine?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes. I go back to this commune, because it was typical of the necessary work that was done there. I say I went through those communes where this famine condition existed and they sowed about 50 to 60 or 70 per cent of the normal crop, which was in every case seed furnished by the Government. There was seed there; they did not get enough rye off the crop to seed the ground.

Mr. BUTENON. What do you say as to the adaptability of Indian corn for food for them? Could they readily use it?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes, sir. They are well equipped to use corn for food. Every commune in Russia has its communal windmill, with the old-fashioned stone burrs, at which they grind all their food. In this manner, instead of extract-

ing the oil as we do in this country, it will be kept in the meal and furnish them the fat which they so much need. In recent years they have been raising some Indian corn. The commissar of agriculture in the lower Volga Valley has been carrying on a campaign to induce the Russian farmers to raise corn, to diversify crops, and get away from the antiquated three-year system under which they cultivate but one-third of the land each year. The commissar of the Tartar Republic has been very active in this educational work.

Mr. LINEBERGER. You have referred to the Tartar Republic. What relation does the Tartar Republic bear to soviet Russia?

Mr. GOODRICH. It is part of it. It is called or designated the Tartar Republic. It is really a State in the Russian Republic. They elect their own governor, various State officials, and other local officers; but the prime minister, the real head of the government, is appointed by the central government at Moscow.

Mr. CONNALLY. When was it you made these observations? How long ago?

Mr. GOODRICH. We reached Russia on the 21 day of October and stayed there until the 17th day of November. It was through the months of October and part of November.

Mr. CONNALLY. If this bill were amended to carry \$20,000,000 appropriation, then you would double the 10,000,000 bushels of corn and the 1,000,000 bushels of seed grain?

Mr. GOODRICH. Yes.

Mr. COCKRAN. Leaving it to the discretion of the President?

Mr. GOODRICH. It would leave some discretion in the hands of the President, and I am quite sure he would not abuse it.

Mr. COCKRAN. What is the extent of the organization of the American Relief Administration in Russia? How big a machine?

Mr. GOODRICH. It is not very big. They do not need a very big machine. About 75 is the number of personnel; not over that. The local people do all the work, and without charge furnish the buildings and transportation, equipment, and everything.

Mr. SABATH. Does the soviet government aid in any way or assist distribution?

Mr. GOODRICH. They furnish transportation free all over the country and assist in every way they can. They are not quite as efficient as we in this country, but they are doing it in a whole-hearted way, cooperating with the American Relief Administration.

Mr. CONNALLY. If Russia were recognized and we had traded with them, would not that relieve a great deal of this distress all over the Republic?

Mr. GOODRICH. That, again, is a question I would rather not discuss except in executive session.

Mr. CONNALLY. I withdraw the question.

Mr. GOODRICH. I am obliged to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further you desire to say, governor?

Mr. GOODRICH. No; I will get together these statistics if you care to have them in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my desire, if the committee approves, to have some action on this matter before Christmas.

Mr. GOODRICH. It ought to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would put your exhibits in shape, so that the clerk of the committee can have them this afternoon. I feel it necessary to have these hearings printed before the matter is heard on the floor.

Mr. COCKRAN. Before this witness is dismissed, he has mentioned two or three matters that we prefer discussed in executive session, and I think they are of transcendent interest. I would like to have the remainder heard in executive session.

Mr. GOODRICH. I will retire to your office, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, and get these ready and will remain here.

Statement of Russian situation based on 1921 yearbook and estimate of 1921 crops.

AREA SOWN AND CROPS.

[Area in thousands of dessiatines; crop raised, in thousands of net tons.]

	Area 1916.	Area 1921.	Crops 1916.	Crops 1921.
Archangel.....	45	28	50	41
Astrak.....	625	395	196	78
Don. Province.....	3,851	1,038	2,881	167
Kaluga.....	311	184	327	140
Kasan.....	1,144	667	1,096	204
Kholm.....	334	200	278	140
Kastrom.....	1,225	779	1,514	567
Kuvask.....	746	448	701	338
Musk.....	648	390	621	476
Moghill.....	147	200	141	141
Moscow.....	607	364	579	176
Nijia Nov.....	212	145	241	137
Novg.....	61	36	62	35
Orel.....	887	443	957	433
Orub.....	1,629	1,425	682	299
Reusa.....	736	442	658	166
Revat.....	1,258	755	1,005	302
Petro.....	75	126	78	78
Pskov.....	427	256	259	148
Ryaz.....	685	343	693	346
Samar.....	3,653	1,645	2,111	212
Sarat.....	1,979	1,770	1,287	495
Seimb.....	963	720	804	216
Taneb.....	479	287	369	204
Smol.....	1,338	803	1,575	728
Tola.....	622	373	632	316
Tuco.....	346	204	335	163
Ula.....	1,183	1,427	1,560	542
Vlob.....	570	242	412	210
Volog.....	333	212	370	300
Voren.....	1,837	1,102	1,239	970
Vial.....	1,753	1,052	1,432	730
Yarosl.....	150	90	142	72
Vitines.....	228	197	319	163
Total.....	31,857	18,817	26,383	9,772
Ukraine:				
Kiatin.....	2,608	1,564	2,496	1,498
Chemg.....	962	577	856	618
Kharb.....	1,605	963	2,057	1,464
Khen.....	3,293	1,976	3,131	1,879
Kiev.....	1,336	802	1,846	1,108
Poltov.....	1,140	681	1,383	966
Palov.....	1,733	1,040	2,229	1,612
Tanvil.....	2,440	1,464	2,558	1,543
Volbas.....	710	426	886	620
Total.....	13,828	9,496	17,422	11,308

RECAPITULATION.

Totals European Russia except Bessarabia:

Area 1916.....	47,684,000
Area 1921.....	28,313,000
Crop 1916.....	43,805,000
Crop 1921.....	21,080,000
Crops per dessiatine:	
1916 ¹	56
1921 ²	45
Crops per capita:	
1916 ¹	22
1921 ²	12.7

¹ Russian Year Book.

² Brooks Report.

Soviet report Sept. 29, 1921, with Brook's estimate of 1921 crops.

[Consuming and producing areas of European Russia except Bessarabia and Ukraine, population 75,497,000.]

	Area planted and yield.		Gross poods.	Net.	Per capita.	
	Dessiatines.	Yield.			Poods.	Pounds.
Grain.....	28,749	32.6	937,926	688,939	9.1	328
Potatoes.....	1,749	539.3	235,845	203,070	2.7	97
Total.....	30,528		1,173,771	891,009	11.8	425

Area of crop shortage, population 49,769,000.

[Area and production in thousands of dessiatines and poods.]

	Area.	Gross yield.	Net.	Per dessiatine.	Per capita.	
					Gross.	Net.
Grain.....	13,192	513,679	355,513	292.0	10.3	7.2
Potatoes.....	853	129,615	111,272	544.1	2.6	2.2
Total.....	14,145	643,294	466,785		12.9	9.4

Ukraine, population 25,805,000.

[Area and production in thousands of dessiatines and poods.]

	Area.	Gross.	Net.	Per dessiatine.	Per capita.	
					Gross.	Net.
Grain.....	13,373	672,300	571,951	50.3	26.1	22.2
Potatoes.....	474	94,938	82,359	800.5	3.7	5.2
Total.....	13,847	767,238			29.8	27.4

Total area of projected fund of the Tat Republic according to data of 1917.

	Per cent.
Furms.....	145,847.59
Fields.....	3,304,043.74
Hay fields.....	410,806.55
Forests and shrubbery.....	1,013,098
Pasturage.....	126,129.87
Fruit and vegetable gardens.....	7,635
Undistributed arable land.....	344,931.86
Total of arable land.....	5,352,592.61
Unarable land.....	368,284.09
Grand total.....	5,720,877.30

Sowing of winter crop of various years.

Area for—	Dessiatines.
1915.....	1,055,382
1916.....	1,037,204
1917.....	1,056,137.5
1918.....	938,108.8
1919.....	947,950.9
1920.....	880,000
1921.....	880,000
1922.....	386,000

Rye harvest of various years.

Average for—	Poods per dessiatinas.
1885-1917.....	52
1917.....	42.5
1920.....	20.8
1921.....	2.3

Rye crop of various years.

	Poods.
1885-1917.....	54,919,150
1917.....	44,885,843.75
1920.....	19,717,378.72
1921.....	2,024,000

Horses.

	Head.
According to 1917 census.....	571,007
According to 1920 census.....	419,346
According to census of March 1, 1921.....	255,397
Actual loss, average since 1919.....	316,210
Actual loss, average from 1920.....	103,949

Percentage of loss:

For 1917.....	56
For 1920.....	40

Large cattle.

	Head.
According to 1917 census.....	724,800
According to 1920 census.....	411,511
According to census for 1921.....	307,844
Actual loss, average since 1919.....	416,854
Actual loss, average from 1920.....	103,667

Percentage of loss:

For 1917.....	58
For 1920.....	25

Potatoes—Area sowed during various years.

	Dessiatinas.
1914 to 1920.....	28,134
1920.....	26,583
1921.....	20,477
Projected sowing for 1922.....	70,471

Vegetable gardening.

	Dessiatinas.
1917.....	700
1921.....	2,150.5
1922.....	21,938

Seeds required for area of 21,938 dessiatinas.

	Poods.	Foots.		Poods.	Foots.
Cabbage.....	75		Onion.....	47,970	20
Beet.....	1,454	10	Onion seeds.....	57	20
Carrot.....	530		Turnip.....	53	10
Turnip, large.....	30	(1)	Turnip.....	2	10
Radish large (horse).....	40	20	Haricot beans.....	84	22
Cucumber.....	300	30	Beans.....	84	22
Pumpkin.....	30	30	Radish.....	25	22
Parsley.....	20	10			

¹ No stock whatever.

Summer-sowing area of various kinds.

	Dessiatinas.
Average for 1903 to 1914.....	1,092,826
Average for 1914 to 1920.....	958,872
Average for 1920.....	852,614
1921.....	841,110
1922 projected.....	1,182,867

Summer crop of previous years.

	Average for 30 years.	Harvest of 1917.	Harvest of 1920.		Average for 30 years.	Harvest of 1917.	Harvest of 1920.
Oats.....	40.7	27.3	19.3	Peas.....	33.5	16.1	20.2
Wheat.....	34.7	20.8	22.4	Lentils.....	33.1	14.1	13.3
Barley.....	40.0	24.0	18.1	Flax.....	25.1	10.4
Barley.....	46.5	22.1	18.4	Hemp.....	31.4	14.3
Millet.....	29.5	28.5	16.7	Potatoes.....	392.5	202.4
Buckwheat.....	26.4	24.0	9.8				

Summer harvest, 1920, according to special commission figures.

	Poods per dessiatine.	Foots.		Poods per dessiatine.	Foots.
Wheat.....	2	15	Peas.....	3	29
Barley.....	1	37	Lentils.....	4	10
Oats.....	1	39	Flax.....	2	37
Buckwheat.....	2	32	Hemp.....	2	30
Barley.....	2	31	Potatoes.....	144	22
Millet.....	2	20			

Seeds required for 1922 according to plan.

Kind.	Quantity of seed.	Number of dessiatinas.	Per cent per kind.	Kind.	Quantity of seed.	Number of dessiatinas.	Per cent per kind.
Wheat.....	1,498,450	111,456.6	9.4	Lentils.....	253,703	33,973	2.9
Barley.....	114,965	11,514.38	9	Flax.....	267,712	29,673	2.6
Oats.....	5,258,446	530,844	44.0	Hemp.....	96,796	18,816	1.2
Buckwheat.....	1,144,581	145,378	12.4	Potatoes.....	5,625,284	70,471	6.0
Barley.....	653,993	87,719	7.6	Total.....	15,803,809	1,182,867	100
Millet.....	306,850	102,927	8.7				
Bearded wheat.....	366,179	49,897	4.3				

Comparative statement of area, in dessiatinas, sowed in Province of Samara for years 1916 and 1918 to 1921.

Year.	Rye sowed.	Wheat sowed.	Total sowed.	Per cent decrease over—
				1916 1918
1916.....	1,088,000	2,567,000	3,655,000
1918.....	808,177	1,944,000	2,752,177	25
1919.....	702,508	1,553,000	2,255,508	30
1920.....	635,000	1,464,236	2,099,236	42
1921.....	541,000	775,000	1,316,544	64

German communes, 1921.

Population	515,895
Food required	4,639,055
Total crop	978,000
Total deficit	3,663,050
Total deficit	2,197,833

COMMUNE OF SCHILLING-SARATOV, RUSSIA.

Population	3,798
Plough land	3,595
Pasture, hay, and willow land	872
Total	4,467
Per capita	1.18

DESIATINES PLANTED, AND YIELD, IN FOODS.¹

	1919		1920		1921	
	Planted.	Yield.	Planted.	Yield.	Planted.	Yield.
Rye	493	4,900	502	3,552	275	150
Oats	36	56	35	245	15	8
Wheat	796	22,880	928	4,640	167	55
Millet	110	2,200	2	22	33	88
Sunflower	135	7,000	110	19,800	12	1,450
Potatoes	1,500	37,570	1,734	30,503	1,255	2,351
Government tax, in pounds		12,000		5,000		

¹ Sowed for 1922: 330 desiatines of rye, with seed furnished by the government; are prepared to sow 800 desiatines of wheat.

LIVE STOCK IN COMMUNE.

	1919	1920	1921
Horses	1,223	801	451
Cows	1,352	1,156	424
Sheep	781	246	58
Pigs	3,988	2,754	1,246

They have 1,146 children under 15 years of age; 800 must have help or die; 18 orphans, without parents, being fed by commune.

Deaths since January 1:	25
Cholera	30
Typhus	45
Starvation	

BABAROFF, 10 MILES SOUTHWEST OF SCHILLING.

[2,816 people, 3,100 desiatines of land.]

Amount of foodstuffs (rye, wheat, oats, and potatoes):	
1919—Planted	1,200
Yield	42,060
1920—Planted	1,080
Yield	36,045
1921—Planted	1,100
Yield	1,100

They had surplus in 1919 and 1920 and have some carried over. Have enough to last until March 1 to April 1. Have sowed 400 desiatines of rye with seed sowed by the Government and are prepared to sow 700 desiatines of wheat in the spring.

POPULATION OF SARATOV COMMUNES.

	Population	Desiatines of land.	Square miles.	Population per square mile.
Schilling	3,798	4,467	19.0	199
Balser	8,100	9,000	38.3	210
Bapski	3,010	3,958	16.0	179
Dezhnev	6,222	9,000	38.0	162
Henk	6,000	9,100	39.5	154
Norga	8,300	21,000	88.0	96
Babaroff	2,800	31,000	13.0	215
Total	38,440	50,625	251.8	130

¹ In this commune, prior to the revolution, they had a number of thriving industries which furnished employment to their excess population, which was at that time something like 12,500, but after the nationalization of the factories, they soon closed down, throwing their employees out of work and the population decreased to about 8,100.

² The excess land attached to this commune is accounted for by the fact that about 6 years ago this commune purchased 5,000 desiatines of land adjoining it and paid for it out of the communal earnings.

The population of a large part of the famine district is very dense. In Saratov it is 105 to the square mile; Kazan, 118; Simbursk, 111; and Samara, 69. Eliminating the waste lands that can not be cultivated or used for pasture, the extreme density of the population becomes apparent. Ninety per cent of these people live in the Communes, and since the destruction of all industry they are all dependent upon the soil.

NECESSITY OF CORN SEEDS AND WORKING CATTLE WITH REFERENCE TO THE SOWING AREAS IN 1921, 1920, AND 1912.

The account of necessary corn seeds.—The only districts in Russia which will not lack corn seeds are Siberia and Ukraina. All the others, and especially the southeastern unfertile districts, will experience a shortage in corn seeds.

The definition of the amount of corn seeds required to reestablish the areas that were sown in 1921, 1920, and 1912 is stated below and based on the figures of the areas that were sown in the mentioned years.

Changes in the sown areas.—In these years the sown areas of European Russia have changed as follows:

	All crops.		Six chief cereals (rye, wheat, oats, barley, buckwheat, and millet).	
	Sown areas in 1,000 desiatines.	In per cent of 1912.	Sown areas in 1,000 desiatines.	In per cent of 1912.
1912 (European Russia without Ukraina)	53,821	100	51,073	100
1920 (European Russia without Ukraina)	36,287	76.4	38,865	76.1
1921	30,945	57.4	28,532	55.9

From this follows that the whole of the sown area in European Russia during the years 1912–1921 declined by 26.6 million desiatines, or by 37 per cent; in Ukraina the sown areas declined to 14,300 thousand from 17,998 thousand, viz. 20.5 per cent; in Siberia and the Kirgize Province during the years of 1912–1920 the sown areas increased from 7 million desiatines to 9.6 million desiatines, but for the last years, 1920 and 1921, it fell lower than the prewar

figure to 6.9 million dessiatines. The changes in the separate crops in European Russia, excluding Ukraina, are as follows:

Name of crop.	In thousands of dessiatines.			In percentage compared to 1912.	
	1912	1920	1921	1920	1921
Winter rye.....	17,664	13,165	12,381	74.5	70.1
Spring rye.....	112	67	67	59.8	59.8
Winter wheat.....	3,475	1,981	1,562	56.8	44.8
Spring wheat.....	11,405	6,911	4,196	60.6	36.8
Oats.....	10,694	6,472	5,496	60.5	51.1
Barley.....	4,796	2,178	1,515	45.8	38.2
Buckwheat.....	901	756	596	80.9	66.1
Millet.....	2,096	2,634	2,443	127.5	118.2

The most marked decline for both periods is noticed in the sowing of marketable grain—wheat, oats, and barley. Regarding other crops, the sowing areas of potatoes has declined three times, flaccous flax seven times, while those of Indian corn have practically not changed.

The areas under sugar beets in Ukraina has declined from 700,000 desiatin to 140,000 desiatin.

2. *Corn seeds necessary for 1912, 1920, and 1921.*—The corn seeds necessary for sowing the said areas was defined (in European Russia, without Ukraina) in whole million poods:

	At the medium calculation of 1 pood to the desiatin.	In 1912.	In 1920.	In 1921.
Winter rye.....	9.0	155	118	111
Spring rye.....	9.0	1	6	6
Winter wheat.....	8.7	31	12	14
Spring wheat.....	6.8	77	47	20
Oats.....	11.3	119	73	62
Barley.....	7.9	40	17	14
Buckwheat.....	8.2	7	6	5
Millet.....	2.2	4.5	6	5
Balance of principal crops.....		434.5	282.6	240.6

3. The necessity in Indian corn in European Russia is very little, less than 1,000,000 poods, but as it is desirable to augment the sowing of this crop, one must calculate the amount of Indian corn at not less than 5,000,000 poods.

To what extent the corn-seed necessary of European Russia, without Ukraina, can be met by the resources of Russia itself? To answer this question we calculate the minimum want of the population for victualizing and cattle feeding. For this we take the following figures as minimum for both of these necessities on each inhabitant: In districts where crops are bad, 10 poods; in others, from 10 to 21 poods, which makes an average of 12.8 poods.

Taking these figures and calculating through them, together with the amount of inhabitants, the quantity of corn necessary and balancing the result with the corn resources of European Russia, without Ukraina, we get the following deficiency in corn, which if not met with will leave a shortage in corn seeds in European Russia, without Ukraina:

	Poods.
Same area as in 1921.....	175,000,000
Same area as in 1920.....	217,000,000
Same area as in 1912.....	350,000,000

Part of this shortage can be met by exportation from Ukraina and Siberia. The excess in corn in Ukraina is 144,000,000 poods; in Siberia, 76,000,000 poods. But it would be rash to say that all this excess would necessarily go

to the lacking east and northwestern districts and the Volga. In view of transport and other conditions, we can rely on receiving from Siberia and Ukraina about of the excess, viz, up to 100,000,000 poods. This means that in European Russia there will be a deficiency in the following crops of corn seeds in million poods and proportionally calculated areas:

	1921	1920	1921
Wheat.....	36.5	55.8	133.7
Oats.....	22.8	34.9	83.0
Barley.....	4.8	9.8	18.4
Buckwheat.....	2.3	3.5	8.2
Peas.....	.7	1.2	3.7
Flax.....	.7	1.2	3.7
Hemp.....	.7	1.2	3.7
Indian corn.....	5.0	7.0	10.0
Lentils.....	.7	1.2	3.7
Sunflower seed.....	.8	1.2	2.7
Balance.....	75.0	117.0	290.0

THE DEFICIENCY OF CORN SEED IN THE UNFERTILE SOUTHEASTERN DISTRICT.

Specially defining the bad harvesting, southeastern district, one can say that the deficiency in corn seed there is as follows:

(In million poods.)

Name of crop.	1912	1920	1921
Winter rye.....	11.2	8.5	8.0
Winter wheat.....	30.1	17.3	12.0
Oats.....	23.0	14.9	12.0
Barley.....	5.7	2.4	2.0
Buckwheat.....	1.8	1.6	1.3
Millet.....	1.5	2.0	1.7
Lentils.....	.8	.5	.4
Peas.....	.8	.5	.4
Flax.....	.8	.5	.4
Hemp.....	.8	.5	.4
Indian corn.....	4.5	2.9	2.4
Sunflower seed.....	.8	.5	.1
Balance.....	81.8	52.1	41.9

This general deficiency in corn seeds in the southeast can be partially met by the reserves of Russia. Taking all conditions in view one can supply the southeastern district with up to 25,000,000 poods of corn seeds. Taking this into consideration, the ultimate deficiency in corn seeds in the southeastern district that will have to be met by imports from abroad can be stated in the following figures, taking the measurement of areas in proportion:

(In million of poods.)

Name of crop.	1912	1920	1921
Wheat.....	26.1	12.5	7.6
Oats.....	16.5	7.8	4.9
Barley.....	2.8	1.3	.8
Buckwheat.....	1.7	.8	.6
Lentils.....	.6	.3	.2
Peas.....	.6	.3	.2
Flax.....	.6	.3	.2
Hemp.....	.6	.3	.2
Indian corn.....	6.7	3.2	2.0
Sunflower seed.....	.6	.3	.2
Balance.....	56.8	27.1	16.9

Account of necessary working cattle over all European Russia.—Taking the military horse census of 1912 and the agricultural censuses of 1916-20 in combination we get the following amounts of working cattle (in thousands of heads):

	1912, work horses.	1916 oxen.	1920		Decrease in percentage.	
			Work horses.	Oxen.	Work horses.	Oxen.
European Russia without Ukraine.....	13,714	1,270	10,141	870	27	31
Ukraine.....	4,303	277	2,796	194	30	30
Balance with Ukraine..	18,017	1,547	12,937	1,064	28	31

Usually one work horse is taken as equal to a pair of oxen as to working capacity. So that in 1920 the figures of working cattle are:

In European Russia without Ukraine.....	10,576
In Ukraine.....	2,893
Total.....	12,469

For 1921, definite figures are not yet available. But taking into consideration the figures that are available and the experience of previous famine years, one can probably state that in 1922 on the territory of European Russia there will be working cattle as follows:

Without Ukraine.....	8,461
In Ukraine.....	2,404
Total.....	10,865

In 1912, on each head of working cattle there was an average of 3.9 dessiatines of sown area. Taking this figure as the normal for husbanding the land in peasant economy, we get that the amount of cattle said to be in existence for 1922 could cultivate on the territory of European Russia (without Ukraine) 33 million dessiatines; in Ukraine, 9.4 million dessiatines. Meanwhile the whole amount of cultivated ground (counting the secondary technical plants) comes up to, in million dessiatines:

Years.	In European Russia (without Ukraine).	In Ukraine.
1921.....	30.9	14.2
1920.....	30.3	13.7
1912.....	33.8	18.0

From this the lack of working cattle is obvious for the cultivated area—

	Without Ukraine.	In Ukraine.	Total.
1921.....	1,260,000	1,300,000	2,560,000
1920.....	840,000	1,100,000	1,940,000
1912.....	2,940,000	2,210,000	5,150,000

The lack of working cattle in the unfertile southeastern district.—Calculating the amount of cultivated areas in the southeast and the probable figures of working cattle for 1922, the lack of the latter in the southeastern district is formulated as follows:

Conditionally keeping up the cultivated areas of—

	Heads.
1921.....	327,000,000
1920.....	1,115,000,000
1912.....	3,294,000,000

The deficiency in working power in the unfertile southeastern district, as seen from the above is greater than that of all the European Russia, without Ukraine. This is explained by the greater decline in the southeast in cattle and also by an excess of cattle in other districts in ordinary times.

(Signed) CHIEF OF THE BOARD.
(Signed) THE MANAGER OF THE AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENT ACCOUNTANCY SECTION.
(Signed) THE MANAGER OF AFFAIRS.

Facts obtained November 10 from commissar of agriculture as to crop situation in Russia.

EUROPE AND RUSSIA WITHOUT UKRAINE.

Year.	Total dessiatines sown, all crops.	Total dessiatines sown in six chief cereals (rye, wheat, oats, barley, buckwheat, millet).	Per cent of decrease.
1912.....	53,821,000	51,673,000	109
1920.....	36,287,000	38,865,000	76.1
1921.....	30,945,000	28,332,000	58.9

	Dessiatines.
Total decrease in 9 years.....	22,541,000
Decrease in Ukraine.....	14,399,000
Decrease in Siberia ¹	100,000

¹ In Siberia the area sown increased from 1912 to 1920 from 7,000,000 to 9,000,000 dessiatines and in 1921 decreased to 6.9 dessiatines.

Change in separate crops in thousands of dessiatines and per cent of change.

Name of crop.	1912	1920	1921	Per cent comparative, 1912.	
				1920	1921
Winter rye.....	17,664	13,165	12,381	74.5	70.1
Spring rye.....	112	67	67	59.8	59.1
Winter wheat.....	3,475	1,678	1,562	48.3	45.3
Spring wheat.....	11,405	6,914	4,196	60.6	36.8
Oats.....	10,698	6,472	3,496	60.5	31.1
Barley.....	4,766	2,178	1,818	45.8	38.2
Buckwheat.....	911	736	596	80.9	66.1
Millet.....	2,066	2,631	2,443	127.5	118.2

NOTE.—It is interesting to note that the marketable grains, wheat, oats and barley, have declined in a heavier ratio than the nonmarketable grains. In addition to this the area of potatoes has declined three times, flax 7 times, while the area of Indian corn has practically remained stationary. Millet, a comparatively new crop in Russia and which is consumed locally for bread, has actually increased.

Indian corn has been used to a small extent in the southeast Volga Valley. Something less than 1,000,000 poods would be required to sow approximately the same area that was sown in 1918. After conferring with the commissar of agriculture, I am quite certain that 5,000,000 poods of Indian corn, carefully selected from districts having approximately the same climatic conditions as the Volga Valley, could be used.

Taking all the information that I could obtain after conferring with the commissar of agriculture in Moscow, with the commissars of the Provinces in

the famine districts, and from the data collected from the various communes visited, it is my judgment that the shortage in corn seeds, namely, spring wheat, rye, and other food seeds, in order to sow the same area as in 1921 will be approximately 150,000,000 poods. To sow the area of 1920 would require 200,000,000 poods and to sow the area of 1912 would require 350,000,000 poods. Part of this shortage can be met by importations from Ukraine and Siberia. Ukraine has an excess of products of 144,000,000 poods. Siberia has an excess of 76,000,000 poods.

In view of the difficulties of transportation, the inability of the Soviet Government to command the money sufficient to purchase the corn, the net shortage in European Russia in order to sow the same amount of crops as sown in 1921 will be 70,000,000 poods; to sow the same crop as sown in 1920, 110,000,000 poods, and to sow the same crop as 1912, 250,000,000 poods.

After allowing all that the Government can possibly furnish in the famine districts, to sow the 1912 crop and confining ourselves to wheat and Indian corn, the shortage will be approximately 15,000,000 poods to sow the 1921 crop; to sow the 1920 crop, 27,000,000 poods; to sow the 1912 crop, 56,000,000 poods.

NOVEMBER 1, 1921.

HERBERT HOOVER, Esq.,

*The honorable the Secretary of Commerce,
United States Department of Commerce,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. HOOVER: On reaching Moscow on the 8th of October, I found Col. Haskell had gone to Samara, and in accordance with your request that I make a rapid survey of the famine district, I at once arranged to leave Moscow and on the 10th started, going first to Samara. I am now, as you requested, sending you a preliminary report.

After getting all the facts I can from the official reports and talking with millers, grain merchants, and men who, by reason of their past connection with the business of the famine district and of Russia in general, are able to give much valuable information, I find that European Russia produced this year from 328 to 350 pounds of grain per capita, a larger amount than the per capita consumption in America.

The Russian eats but little meat; bread is his staff of life, and he consumes in normal years about 450 to 480 pounds, while the American consumes, as I remember it, from 290 to 330 pounds per capita. In what is known as the non-famine district or area of sufficient food, and which according to the soviet report of September 29, 1921, covers one-third of the population—25,000,000—and over two-thirds of the area, exclusive of the Ukraine, the production of foodstuffs per capita is:

	Gross pounds per capita.	Net pounds per capita.
Grain.....	394	468
Potatoes.....	148	130
Total food crops.....	742	598

leaving, after deducting the normal amount for seed in this part of Russia, 598 pounds per capita and a considerable surplus for export.

In the area of insufficient food with a population of 50,000,000, according to the same report, and one-third of area outside Ukraine, the production of foodstuffs per capita is:

	Gross pounds per capita.	Net pounds per capita.
Grain.....	371	259
Potatoes.....	94	79
Total food crops.....	465	338

The net amount is arrived at here, as above, by deducting from the gross seed required for this fall and next spring's requirements. In the Ukraine, with a population of 25,000,000, the production is:

	Gross (pounds per capita).	Net (pounds per capita).
Grain.....	939	799
Potatoes.....	133	115
Total food crops.....	1,072	914

Assuming 430 as the minimum requirement per capita, and the surplus in one-third of Russia outside of Ukraine is..... 1,850,000
Surplus in Ukraine..... 4,350,000

Total surplus..... 6,400,000
Deficit in area of insufficient crops..... 2,800,000

The net surplus..... 3,600,000
If 480 pounds, the maximum ration, is assumed, there must be deducted from this surplus..... 1,500,000

Which would leave in all Russia a net surplus..... 2,100,000

If these figures as given out by the Soviet Government on the 28th of September are correct, then European Russia has a net surplus of foodstuff. I do not believe there will ever be a day, unless transport utterly breaks down, when food can not be had in Russia, even in the famine districts, if one has the money to buy.

The following are food prices I got in the bazaars of Kazan, Samara, Saratov, Markstadt, and Balser, in the very heart of the worst of the famine district, and it was all of excellent quality:

	Cents per pound.
Butter.....	22
Bread.....	9
Sausage.....	8
Beans.....	34
Flour.....	8
Rice.....	12-15
Good mutton and beef.....	31-4
Cheese.....	20-25

European Russia, or rather that part left in the Soviet Republic, exported in 1912 180 pounds of grain and foodstuffs per capita, or, in round numbers, 9,000,000 tons, or 300,000,000 bushels. Nearly all of this came from the present famine district and the Ukraine, the great surplus food producing sections of Russia.

The official figures in the Samara district give the grain production at 359 pounds per capita and the vegetable equivalent at 70 pounds more, with no seed allowance for fall and spring planting.

In the Saratov district it is 385 pounds of grain per capita and a vegetable equivalent of 75 pounds more, and in the Kazan district it is 465 pounds per capita and a vegetable equivalent of 71 pounds more, with no allowance for fall and spring planting.

It is not easy to reconcile the figures one gets at Moscow with the figures given at Samara, Saratov, and Kazan, all on the Volga and admittedly the worst of the famine district, now with the facts obtained from the several typical communes visited. But after visiting Kazan, Samara, Saratov, the capitals of these famine-stricken Provinces, and also Markstadt, the headquarters of the German communes, and after having visited 5 communes in the Samara district, all Russian and 12 communes in the Saratov district and met with the local officials, examined their warehouses, and gone over their communal records, I am certain, from their own statements, they have at least four to five months' supply of food for the entire population, and probably more.

They tell you there is no concealed supply. I question the correctness of this, for it is contrary to human nature and the semioriental character of the famine provinces.

I say this for two reasons: First, the Government in 1919 and 1920, and in the provinces of surplus foods this year, has been requisitioning grain and all food supplies very closely. This alone would lead to concealment and understating of both the amount planted and harvested, for the requisitions last year and this have been graded to some extent according to the amount produced.

Again, the threatened famine, the certainty of which has been well known all over Russia for at least eight months, the prospective high prices, and the opportunity freely offered in all the bazars of Russia to sell food, is a further inducement to hoarding, or rather concealment of food supplies from the Government and their sale at high prices in the markets.

Again, the threatened famine and the prospective very high prices of food-stuffs, has led this year as it did in the great famine of 1891 to the use of certain articles for food that figures in none of the reports. I saw them in three communes gathering weeds, wild-rose pods and a bur very much like our cockle-burs. They thrash the seeds from these and take them to their local mills which are in almost every commune in Russia and mixing them with rye or harsen (our millet) have them ground for bread.

In every commune I was in I saw them, in some fields by hand and in others by machine, gathering seeds which grow in profusion on fallow ground and which they call famine seeds because used only in famine years. These they haul to their communes and place in barns and stacks ready for use when all else fails. They did this in 1891 and tell me that while their live stock will not eat it until all else is exhausted, they will eat it when very hungry and it will keep them alive until spring.

I saw on every hand evidences of the greatest care that nothing having any food value be wasted. Cabbage leaves, melon rinds, and articles of this kind ordinarily thrown away are now utilized.

In one commune, Baro in Saratov, I did not notice a single dog, a rather unusual condition for Russia, and on inquiry the local secretary of the commune told me that they had butchered about all of them and made them into bologna and sausage for use this winter.

Following the custom of this people and its tendency to migrate in famine years from the stricken districts to where there is said to be food in plenty, I found many thousands going in all directions, a few toward Moscow and north Russia, many more to Siberia and others down the Volga River and to the Ukraine.

The population of the city of Samara has decreased over 50,000 and the county communes in my opinion, and from the data obtained in the three communes I visited, far more than that. The same thing is true of Saratov. In the German communes alone where the most accurate records are kept, the decrease has been 194 per cent by migration, cholera, typhus, and starvation, and I am sure it is equally true through the entire famine district. While I am not, as you know, intimately acquainted with the Russian character, this being my first visit, I am very much impressed by the ability of the people to adapt themselves to the very trying situation that confronts them and to a very considerable extent discount the facts as disclosed by the official figures. While all this is true and while the ridiculous so-called human-interest stories sent out by sensational newspaper correspondents grossly exaggerate the situation, yet going into the situation as carefully as I could in the limited time at my disposal I am certain that the situation is such that if immediate relief is not given, with the assurance of continued aid until July 1 hundreds of thousands of people, men, women, and children, will perish in the famine district who otherwise might live.

In making my hurried investigation I did not trust to Government statistics, to appearances in the bazars or on the cities' streets, nor in the provincial homes in the large cities, where the children whose parents have died or abandoned them are collected together, dirty, half naked, lony, half starved, mere skeletons with helpless, hopeless, hunted looks in their eyes, but I went down to these communes, distant from the cities and the railroads, slept in their homes, and ate their bread, selecting for this purpose communes which fairly would represent the average condition throughout the Volga or famine district. I went over their communal records, always well kept, examined their warehouses, their feeding kitchens, their hospitals, and went into the poorer sec-

tions of each commune, going into the houses to see for myself the conditions that existed. I am very certain that what I saw there is typical of the conditions that obtain in the Volga Valley from Kazan to the lower Volga, 50 miles below Saratov, which was the limit of my investigation.

The situation is bad at Kazan but worse in Simbirsk, Samara, and Saratov. I am satisfied that as the valley descends below the sea level as it passes through Astrakhan that the situation will grow worse as the low level of the lower Volga, surrounded as it is with lands of much higher elevation, reduces the amount of rainfall.

If I am not able to get the official statistics brought down to October 1 to you in this letter, I will send them out by next courier, but I will here give you the statistics from two communes, one Russian the other German, that will give you some idea of the situation that confronts some of the worst of the communes. I visited the commune of Schilling, about 40 versts south of Saratov. It has 3,708 people and 4,467 dessiatines of land, 3,595 dessiatines of which is plow land and the rest pasture, hay, and willow land. Their crops were as follows, in pounds and dessiatines, planted and harvested:

	1919		1920		1921	
	Dessiatines planted.	Poods yield.	Dessiatines planted.	Poods yield.	Dessiatines planted.	Poods yield.
Rye.....	493	4,930	592	3,532	375	150
Oats.....	56	560	35	245	15	5
Wheat.....	796	22,880	928	4,640	167	58
Harsen.....	2	2	2	22	35	88
Sunflower.....	110	2,200	67	2,244	133	600
Potatoes.....	135	7,000	110	19,800	12	1,450
Total.....	1,590	37,570	1,734	30,903	1,255	2,351
Government tax.....	12,000 poods.		5,000 poods.		9 poods of sunflower.	

Live stock in commune during same period.

	1919	1920	1921
Horses.....	1,223	801	451
Cows.....	582	461	313
Sheep.....	1,352	1,156	424
Pigs.....	731	246	58
Total.....	3,888	2,754	1,246

You will notice that while in 1919 and 1920 they produced more than 10 poods per capita, this year they produced but one pood per capita. They have been selling their live stock and everything they could spare to buy food. They are gathering weeds and making every preparation possible in this commune, but they say one-half at least must starve unless they have help, and the facts seem fully to justify the statement.

They have sowed 330 dessiatines of rye, over half a crop, with seed furnished by the Government and have plowed and are prepared to sow 800 dessiatines of wheat if they can secure the seed. They have 1,146 children under 15 years of age and 800 must have help or die. Eighteen orphans without any parents are being cared for by the commune. Deaths from unusual causes since January 1: Cholera, 25; typhus, 30; starvation, 45.

I examined all their communal warehouses and found a small amount of grain in one house, the others empty. They say they can get along until January 1 if they have the assurance of help after that time. They say the Government has promised help but they are afraid it can not give much relief.

Babaroff, Russian commune, about 10 miles southwest of Schilling, with a population of 2,800 people and an area of 3,100 dessiatines of land, 2,200 of

which is plow land. They produced the following amount of food stuffs, rye, wheat, oats, and potatoes during the past three years:

Years.	Dessiatines planted.	Yield.
1919.....	1,200	Food, 48,000
1920.....	1,080	36,065
1921.....	1,100	4,100

The yield gave them a good surplus which they sold in 1919 and 1920, and they have some food carried over; but, say, after March 1 they will have nothing.

They have sowed 400 dessiatines of rye with seed furnished by the Government and are prepared to sow 700 dessiatines of wheat next spring if they can get the seed. The unusual phase of this whole situation is the great density of the population in the whole Volga Valley. These communes are so close together that I counted, while driving across the country, five church spires in sight at one time, and each spire meant a separate commune. I will group together the communes I visited in one day with the dessiatines of each and population.

Name of commune.	Population.	Dessiatines.	Square miles.	Population per square mile.
Schilling.....	2,798	4,467	19	199
Balsar.....	8,100	9,000	38.3	210
Bapaski.....	3,010	3,938	16	179
Dezhnev.....	6,222	9,000	38	162
Huck.....	6,000	9,100	38.5	154
Norga.....	8,500	21,000	88	96
Babaroff.....	2,800	3,100	13	215
Total.....	38,440	39,625	251.8	130

Balsar before the revolution had developed a few industries, consisting of tanneries, dye works, and cotton mills, and most of its people earned their living by working in the factories. The population of Balsar then was 12,000, but thrown out of employment on account of factories being closed through nationalization and the land being insufficient for their sustenance they migrated and the population is now but 8,100.

The whole Volga Valley from Kazan to far below Saratov is densely populated—more than 100 to the square mile, with no industrial life at all, a larger population than can properly be sustained with decent standards of living even in normal years.

The following is the population per square mile of the provinces in the center of the famine district:

Saratov.....	105
Kazan.....	118
Simbursk.....	111
Samara.....	60

As a matter of fact, when the waste lands that can not be cultivated or used for pasture are considered the density is much greater than the above figures would indicate.

Ninety per cent of these people live in the communes, and since the destruction of all industry nearly all are dependent on the soil.

Apply these figures to any American State north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi, excluding the industrial cities, and you can understand how impossible it is to maintain a decent standard of life under any but the most favorable conditions.

It seems strange to an American that in a land with enough to eat to supply the immediate demands that people should die of starvation and with the knowledge of their neighbors in the commune.

At Norga, admitted to be the richest commune in the Volga Valley, for in the years of plenty they purchased 5,000 dessiatines and paid for them out of their communal earnings, a strong sturdy well-fed looking lot of men met us at the communal hall and presented to us the seriousness of the situation and the amount of food in hands. I examined their warehouses and found them as represented. They told me that entire families had died of starvation and that on one day they had buried eight. I counted as I went out more than 100 new-made graves.

I said to them "Will you tell me why it is in this commune that while the majority of you have enough to eat and a surplus to carry you for at least four months that you allow your neighbors to die of starvation?" There was a tense silence for a few moments as the interpreter put the question; finally one strong-faced peasant slowly said "You Americans, living in a land of plenty, don't understand. It can not be helped; there is not enough to feed us all; it is necessary that some should die that others might live."

I could tell you stories of want, suffering, and death due to underfeeding and starvation. Of an old peasant found at Kazan last week along the roadside dead with a little dead child in his arms. Of another father at the same place without food, seeking, with three children, to enter a boat to go down the river, where he might find help, and when told but two of the children could go promptly threw the youngest in the river and boarded the boat, saying "If I can not go, all three must die; it is better that one should die and the others live," and they let him go his way. Of two young peasant girls we found on the outskirts of Bara, their parents dead of cholera four days before, and they with nothing to eat for four days but cabbage leaves and carrots eaten raw, poor, hundry looking, frightfully emaciated, half naked waifs shivering in the cold raw wind, and I could tell you of these things until you would be sick at heart, as I have been, but that does not help to solve the situation.

The Government records, the general condition as I found it, the typical communes I visited, and the facts I have been able to gather from every source show famine conditions far worse than in 1891, when over 200,000 perished, because this one follows six years of foreign and civil war—a condition that demands immediate and effective action if the saving of human life is worth while.

The work the American Relief Association is doing under Col. Haskell is wonderfully fine and efficient. He rapidly is perfecting a highly effective organization under very difficult conditions. This work will save the lives of many thousands of children and will not soon be forgotten by the people of Russia. If possible, the rations should be increased from 1,200,000 to at least 1,500,000, and this will by no means reach all.

Adult feeding should go hand in hand with it, if at all possible, and to that end the Soviet Government should be required to lay their cards on the table and tell you frankly what they can do, so that whatever outside help is given will only be to supplement theirs. Hospitals all over Russia are in great need, and Col. Haskell advises me that the American Relief Association is in a position to supply that need.

I had a long talk with Dr. Dagnoff, of the Renza Hospital, of 800 beds. He has but two thermometers in the hospital and is without the drugs so necessary to treat typhus and cholera, both of which are prevalent. He tells me 75 per cent of his patients die when, with proper treatment, less than 50 per cent should die. His best physician, underfed and underpaid, unable in his condition to stand the work, committed suicide the day before. There is a shortage of 40 per cent of doctors in Russia. At Kazan the hospitals are crowded with patients who are really hungry cases, need food and not medicine, and should be at a feeding station and not a hospital, but the American Relief Association is not now in a position to feed adults outside of hospitals. I was present at the conference with the officials and those in charge of the hospital at Kazan, and they were greatly pleased with the assurance that Col. Haskell gave them at that time that several carloads of supplies were on the way to relieve their distress.

Finally, our Government, through the Grain Corporation or some other organization, should furnish Russia enough hard spring wheat to enable them to sow the millions of dessiatines of land already plowed and ready for sowing in the spring. If this is done, then Russia's immediate famine question is settled for this year and next, and the American Relief Association and all

other charitable organizations could and should withdraw from Russia not later than August, next year.

In every commune I visited I asked them the question, "Can you take care of yourself after next July?" and without the slightest hesitation they all answered "Yes." The governors of Kazan, Samara, Saratov, and Markstadt all confirmed this.

I am sending to you, under separate cover, some comments on the political situation, and also send you herewith a rather rough translation of an article that appeared in a Kazan paper the day we were there, and later on this week will forward to you some statistics concerning the famine situation.

Truly, yours,

J. P. GOODRICH.

HERBERT HOOVER,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: Since writing you my former letter I have been with Col. Haskell to Petrograd and gathered certain additional information that I thought it best to reduce to writing and send to you on my arrival at New York, so that you would have on file a complete report of conditions in Russia as I have been able to ascertain them in my rather brief trip through the country.

While I found considerable hunger and undernourishment in Petrograd among both children and adults, yet outside of the concentration homes, where the abandoned children and orphans are collected and where the refugees from the Volga are assembled, there is but little evidence of actual starvation at this point.

On account of the more acute situation in the Volga Valley, in the event that it is not found possible to arrange to feed all the children of Russia who are in danger of starvation, the number now being fed at Petrograd could be reduced in order to increase the number fed in the famine district.

I examined in connection with Col. Haskell the various concentration homes, the feeding kitchens, warehouses, and hospitals, and find the work of the American Relief Association moving smoothly and efficiently and securing good cooperation from the local authorities.

The same conditions obtain here as to the hospitals that we found elsewhere in Russia, and the officers in charge were very greatly pleased to know that through the American Relief Association they would at an early date receive some assistance.

While at Petrograd I found a cargo of 100,000 bushels of American wheat unloading. It had been purchased through Sweden. Also found the first shipload of German engines unloading, a number of traction engines from England, and a considerable quantity of agricultural implements, which they advised me was from Switzerland.

On my return to Moscow I had a final interview with the commissar of agriculture and he gave me his final figures as to the agricultural situation, a copy of which I herewith inclose to you.

Briefly, it shows that as to the chief food crops—rye, wheat, oats, barley, buckwheat, and millet—there was shied in 1921, 25,000,000 dessiatines less than in 1912, and 6,000,000 dessiatines less than in 1920.

After reviewing at length the amount sown in European Russia in 1912, 1920, and 1921, he estimates that after Russia has exhausted all its available resources there will be required from outside of Russia, in what is known as the famine or insufficient crop district, if only enough is sown to equal the 1921 crop, 16,900,000 poods of seed; if the 1920 area is to be sown it will require 27,100,000 poods, and if the 1912 area is to be equalled it will require 56,800,000 poods of seed.

He also states in this report that there is in this district a shortage of 327,000 head of working cattle (horses and oxen) if the 1921 area is to be planted; a shortage of 1,115,000 if the 1920 area is to be planted; and a shortage of 3,294,000 if the 1912 area is to be planted.

In my former letter I have stated that I do not think that these figures correctly represent the true situation, and my reason for that opinion. I adhere to that opinion.

I discussed with him the question of obtaining seed and also the feeding of the adult population of the famine district. He seems exceedingly anxious that both of these forms of relief should be extended and says they are very essential to the future welfare of Russia, but stated that in his opinion nothing in the way of furnishing seed should be undertaken unless sufficient food is obtained

for the adults in the famine district. That unless this is done they would eat the seed that is sent to them rather than sow it.

I have what seems to be a very accurate report from the Tatar Republic as to the situation there.

The records in this province are better kept and the officials seem more efficient than any with whom I have come in contact in Russia, with the exception of the German communes in Saratov.

I inclose you this report and also some additional reports obtained and bearing on the question of food supply and future planting.

It is my opinion that the results obtained in the Tatar Republic and the German communes are fairly typical of the entire Russian situation.

Basing my estimate on these reports, the information I gained from the numerous communes visited, and the facts obtained from the various persons I talked to through the famine district, it is my judgment that the provinces of insufficient crops will require outside help to the extent of at least 30,000,000 bushels, and could well use 10,000,000 bushels more, and the Government is not at this time in a position to furnish more than one-half of this amount.

Not less than three-fourths of this should go to assist in feeding the adult population and the balance to the seedling of the 1922 crop.

I had an interview with the commissar of railroads and obtained from him the present situation of the railroads.

He gave me the following figures, from his records, and in the main, while some allowance should be made, I think substantially they are correct:

Number of versts of main track in operation, European Russia.....	62,700
Locomotive engines in good running order.....	8,027
Locomotive engines in bad order, needing light repairs.....	7,000
Locomotive engines in bad order, needing heavy repairs.....	2,000
Purchased from Germany and to be delivered in six months.....	900
Purchased from Sweden and to be delivered in six months.....	1,000
Freight wagons in good running order (all kinds).....	440,000
Freight wagons in bad order, needing light repairs.....	101,000
Passenger cars in good running order.....	6,000
Passenger cars in bad running order.....	4,000
Purchased from Canada, to be delivered in six months, tank cars.....	500
New ties placed in the main track during this year.....	1,100,000

If these figures are correct there has been a very substantial improvement in the railroad situation since the filing of the British report last year.

He states that since all car and engine repair work has been put on a piece-work basis the efficiency of the men has increased from four to five times. That the first of the year they expect to put all railroad work on a piece basis and pay according to the work done.

He states that through the civil war more than one-half of the mileage of Russia was put out of commission through blowing up bridges and the destruction of roadway and equipment. He freely admits that they are not in a position to build engines or make anything but light repairs, and states that the great need of the Russian railroads to-day is well-equipped repair shops and the technical skill and materials to make the repairs.

He states that they are in a position without delay to handle the amount of traffic now offered, including any additional amount of freight caused by either adult feeding or the seeding proposition.

I spent an hour with Mr. Checherin and, following the suggestion set out in your cable to Brown, forwarded to Haskell, called his attention to two matters—the release of Americans in Russia and the purchase of foodstuffs in America.

He assured me that as rapidly as the required information is furnished his department that Americans were given permission to leave Russia and that they were not inclined to be technical on this point. Coolidge states to me that he has no complaint on that ground.

He also stated that they were fully prepared to purchase and pay for \$5,000,000 of foodstuffs but that the matter was now being held up in America on account of their desire to have a representative in America, and asked me to see Krassin as I went through London.

I saw Krassin in London and his position was, of course, that of Checherin. I impressed on both of them as best I could the importance of closing the purchase without delay.

I will, when I see you, go into all of these matters in detail. Summing up the result of my investigation, my conclusion is: (a) That the famine in Russia now exists in spots somewhat widely separated and is not general in any particular location.

(b) That unless outside help comes within the next three or four months the famine condition will exist very generally throughout the Volga Valley and a great many men, women, and children, extending into the hundreds of thousands, will die of starvation.

(c) If the present food supplies in European Russia were evenly distributed throughout the Republic, there would be no immediate danger of actual starvation; but in view of the impossibility of such distribution and the certainty of a serious food shortage in a large part of Russia, there is immediate danger of starvation to a great number of people unless the assurance of outside help is given, for those who now have plenty in the famine district will not share with those who have nothing, unless assured of help when the pinch comes.

(d) If the work of the American Relief Association is to be confined to child feeding, then the number fed should be increased to at least one and one-half million.

(e) Some way should be found to feed the starving adult people of Russia and supply them with seed sufficient to sow the land available for planting in the spring of 1922.

Cause of the famine.—The immediate cause of the famine is, of course, the serious crop failure this year following partial famine in 1920 and a general exhaustion of their surplus food supplies through the civil war and government requisitions of foodstuffs in 1919 and 1920.

Famines have occurred in Russia about one each decade since 1871. The worst famine prior to this year was in 1891.

That the policy of the Government in 1919, when it was the announced intention to take all the surplus foodstuffs raised, thus taking from the peasant the ordinary inducement to plant abundant crops had much to do with the short planting in the year 1920, admits of no doubt and is conceded even by Lenin and Trotsky.

The civil war in 1919 swept the Volga Valley clean of its surplus grain supplies. To quote a Volga peasant, "The Reds took all they could get, and then the Whites came along and took what was left."

In addition to this there has been a breakdown of the entire communist system of exchange, which is referred to by Lenin in his very remarkable speech as "a disastrous economic defeat."

The ruble is no longer a measure of value, but, as its name indicates, is a mere counter, and men everywhere are resorting to a system of barter and exchange of goods.

There is a wide difference not only in the nominal value of the ruble but in the prices of the basic commodities.

On the same day an American dollar would buy in Kazan, Samara, and Saratov 70,000 rubles, in Petrograd 90,000 rubles, and in Moscow it would buy 110,000 rubles.

Meat of excellent quality could be purchased on the same day in Saratov, Samara, and Kazan for three to four thousand rubles per pound. The same quality of meat cost twelve to fifteen thousand rubles in Petrograd and seven to eight thousand rubles in Moscow. The same rates of difference obtained as to other staple food products.

The little middleman and food speculator exists all over Russia. On account of the demoralized currency, the breakdown of the established system of warehousing and handling food supplies, and which was destroyed by the policy of the Government, and the high rate of interest (the prevailing rate being 1 per cent per day) the margin between producer and consumer is unusually high, in many cases reaching as high as 100 to 200 per cent.

While, as stated, there have been famines before this one, in which thousands of people starved to death in Russia in years of crop failure in the Volga Valley, years of surplus foodstuffs in all Russia, as shown by the hundreds of millions of poods exported, yet the combination of circumstances above outlined has made this year far worse than any other year of crop failure in Russia.

Very truly, yours,

J. P. GOODRICH.

STATEMENT OF DR. VERNON KELLOGG.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your official position?

Dr. KELLOGG. I am permanent secretary of the National Research Council.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you held that position?

Dr. KELLOGG. Two years.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been in Russia recently?

Dr. KELLOGG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you arrive in Russia?

Dr. KELLOGG. I got there in the first part of September.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you leave?

Dr. KELLOGG. In October. I was there about one month.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you just state in your own way your observation of conditions?

Dr. KELLOGG. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in the light of the very full statement of Gov. Goodrich, a well documented statement, I can make my statement very brief indeed. I have been associated with American relief work in Europe for six years. I went into Belgium for Mr. Hoover and was director there for northern France and Belgium in parts of the years 1915 and 1916. I went to Poland immediately after the armistice as chief of Mr. Hoover's first food mission.

The little which I have to say may simply piece in with Gov. Goodrich's statement. It will be based especially on my competence to make some comparison of the present Russian food situation with the food shortage in other parts of Europe to which we have given some relief from America.

We can judge of the food situation in an alleged famine district by either of one or both of two methods. First, we can take the figures of production and consumption. Even in an office like this distant from the scene one can get an idea of what must be the situation of people from an examination of these statistics. For example, just to add one small set of figures to Gov. Goodrich's, in the Province or "Government" of Samara, on the Volga, in the very center of the famine district, statistics have been compiled by a bureau of statistics under the local government there, headed by an engineer, with whom I became acquainted, an intelligent man, and, apparently, an honest one.

In the prewar years, Samara produced an annual average of 120,000,000 poods of the four principal grains. In 1921, they produced 3,000,000 poods. That would be enough if it was spread out evenly among the people of the Province to keep them alive for about one and one-half months.

There is another way of judging the situation and that is to observe the actual conditions that exist among the people in the alleged famine region. In going from Moscow to the Volga—and I had the privilege of going in with the first American food train from Moscow to Kazan—one begins to get signs of the difficulties in the Volga region long before you come to it. Those signs are the so-called refugees, or the people fleeing in panic from the famine regions. They come along, long trainloads of them, coming to the East out of the famine region. These refugees make camps along the railways and rivers. In one camp on the Volga there were 22,000 men, women, and children. These refugee camps are made up of people who have found no food at home and have converted their household goods, as far as they could, into money and have fled, panic-stricken, trying to get away from the country. The Soviet Government is said to have evacuated nearly 500,000 of these people. It is sending large numbers of them out to Siberia and Turkestan, and to some of the northern Provinces, where the food shortage is not so acute. Now, the striking thing in the refugee camps or villages, in addition to the horrible sights of hunger and suffering in the camps, the striking thing to me, having had the opportunity to observe the food shortage in Belgium, Poland, and elsewhere, is that 50 per cent of the persons in those camps are farmers and their families. In Belgium we never fed a single farmer. In Poland the great mass of people fed by us were the poor people in the cities, the workless workmen without money to buy food, the men in industrial and mining sections. But these camps, half of the people fleeing because of lack of food, are the farmers, the food producers. Always in a country producing food, even a small amount of food, the producers have it, and do not let loose of it unless there is enough to go further around. To me that was evidence enough in itself of the actual wiping out of the crops in that region.

Gov. Goodrich has touched on the attempts to care for the people in the local regions, particularly children. Mothers and fathers will die if they can keep the children alive. At Kazan and Samara and Saratov the officials of the local governments have made an attempt to establish local children's detention homes. There are 15 of them in Saratov and 15 in Kazan. They use buildings taken over without furniture, and the children are brought there, and what food the local governments can get hold of or the central government of Moscow sends in is given to those children. I was in one of those homes in Saratov at the time of the noon meal, when 200 children were sitting on the floor of a large bare room, ragged, all of them emaciated, mere skeletons, and some of them worse than skeletons, because they had the protuberant "hunger belly" that results from eating the moss and leaf and clay bread, which they can not digest. In their meal they had a little horse meat and "kasha," a porridge of grain and seed grits. The peasants are killing their farm animals because they have not food to keep them alive; hence there is horse meat in the market. The kasha is made of hominy grits. I asked the women in charge if this was the regular meal. She said, "Yes; only the food does not always come. When it does this is what we have." I asked, "How about sleeping; what do you do for mattresses and blankets?" She said, "We have no blankets or mattresses; they sleep on the floor here in this room, lying down or sitting." When I told them that the food from America had begun to come and that they would have rice and sugar and milk and white bread to-morrow those women broke down.

The situation is simply incredible to one who has not seen it; indescribable even by one who has seen it. I have seen nothing like it in my six years of experience in the food shortage regions of Europe. In a given spot in Poland, for example, 200 children might be found in as bad condition, but that condition is the rule all down the Volga region, a region of great extent, with a vast population. There are at least 15,000,000 people in the famine region of the Volga, while around that famine region is a food-shortage region including 15,000,000 more. Senator Burton, there is not food enough in the surrounding region to keep the people alive, let alone any to send into the famine regions.

As Gov. Goodrich has pointed out, there is an agricultural breakdown in Russia which has been becoming more and more serious for the last two or three years. And then on top of this has come a terrible drouth, extending over one of the three chief grain-producing regions of Russia; a region which under normal conditions produces food for Moscow and the industrial regions and even for export to other parts of Europe. That food is gone. It is simply a catastrophe.

The soviet government has tried to bring in food. It has been able to bring in only a very small amount. It has tried to bring in seed. I was there when the Government seed rains came down into the Volga and the seeds were parceled out to the farmers. The farmers took the seed and planted it. I am more optimistic in his statement than to say that they had more than one-fifth of their normal needs for planting. Still they can seed more thinly and thus seed more than one-fifth of a crop.

But the individual situation is that millions of people are out of food. I am confident I am telling the truth when I say millions of people are doomed to die in the Volga region unless relief on a large scale comes from outside. The American Relief Administration has paid attention simply to children. We have but limited resources. We do not want to talk politics. But when it comes to the saving of children it is difficult for me to make a distinction between starving children of Belgium, Poland, Russia, or even of America, if that catastrophe should come to us. The children have had nothing to do with the causes of the famine or the present conditions of Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you distinguish so far as the children are concerned there; is there some age limit?

Dr. KELLOGG. It would carry us far afield if I attempted to describe the system of the American Relief Administration. But we limit the children to those from birth to 15 years. We set up in whatever region in which we are working local committees with some doctors as members. The committees are selected by us and not by the soviet government. Say that here are five candidates and we can feed but one; we pick out that one of the five that most needs the food. Not the one in the worst condition, necessarily, but the one that can be saved and kept alive and grow strong. We have to-day that system

in Russia, as we have had it in Poland and other countries all the time. The officials of the Tartar Republic said, "We have a committee in each of the various towns and villages, of the Province, because there is a certain amount of relief work going on all the time. We will just turn over these committees to you." We said, "No, we will set up our own committees. We Americans are responsible to the American people that this food goes only to the children we select and we must know and must control that work absolutely." It is known in Russia to-day that it is American work.

The soviet government gives us transportation and guards, and so far there has not been a single thing in the work that would indicate danger to the food. We control that food absolutely, the use of every ton of it. There is an American placard on every car of food, on every warehouse, on every motor truck, on every kitchen and dining room.

Mr. MOORES. Is there any preference whatever given to any race or creed, or anything of that sort?

Dr. KELLOGG. Sir, we do not know any difference between reds and whites, Jews or gentiles, Catholics or Protestants; there has been no distinction of race or creed or politics in any of our work anywhere in Europe, and there is none in Russia.

Mr. MOORES. No distinction on account of race or nationality?

Dr. KELLOGG. No distinction at all.

Mr. BURTON. What is the fact in regard to discrimination by the soviet government in their rendering of relief?

Dr. KELLOGG. I should say from my casual observation of it that they were not making a sharp discrimination. I would rather not go too far into that subject except in an executive session.

Mr. BURTON. Do you agree with Gov. Goodrich that with \$20,000,000 appropriated by this Congress starvation could be prevented?

Dr. KELLOGG. The first thing is to send in enough food to keep these people alive. Double the amount of corn suggested by President Harding would do that. Then, they should have sufficient seed for the spring planting.

Mr. BURTON. That is sufficient?

Dr. KELLOGG. There should be 5,000,000 bushels.

Mr. BURTON. Putting it into money, do you agree, Doctor, with Gov. Goodrich?

Dr. KELLOGG. I agree as to the amount.

Mr. BURTON. How often do you have to ticket the children?

Dr. KELLOGG. We do it every day. We make the selections. The children are given food tickets. When they have the tickets they get their meals. It is eaten in open kitchens, not taken to the homes. We have 1,000 of these kitchens in the Tartar republic alone. A kitchen is a technical word; it really means kitchen and dining room. Where the child is sick and can bring a statement from a physician to that effect we allow food to be taken to the house for the child, but we want to see the food from the time it enters Russia up to the time it starts down the child's gullet.

Mr. LINDBERGER. You say you make selections. Do you take the children personally to the kitchen, or give them tickets?

Dr. KELLOGG. We give them tickets.

Mr. LINDBERGER. Is that ticket transferable?

Dr. KELLOGG. No.

Mr. LINDBERGER. The food goes to the party you designate?

Dr. KELLOGG. It does.

Mr. COCKRAN. This is a matter important to the committee. You are perfectly certain that whatever money may be appropriated here, every penny of it will reach the objective it is intended to reach?

Dr. KELLOGG. Make it every dollar, and I will say yes.

Mr. COCKRAN. Every dollar.

Dr. KELLOGG. Yes, sir.

Mr. COCKRAN. You think that if there should be a surplus—of course, if we appropriate—if there should be a surplus, that would be certain to be returned?

Dr. KELLOGG. We have a convention signed at Riga with the Soviet Government. In addition, we have agreements with the various local governments, and also additional agreements on details. By our agreements we have the right to reexport any food brought in; it is guaranteed in advance that it may be reexported.

Mr. COCKRAN. What I meant particularly to get at is this: There is no way in which we could direct here that in no case can it be wasted.

Dr. KELLOGG. I do not think so.

Mr. COCKRAN. Whatever would be found unnecessary would at once be returned here.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that convention, so it may be made available to the committee?

Dr. KELLOGG. I have not it here, but it can be given you promptly.

Mr. LINDBERGER. The American Relief Administration in Russia is administered by Mr. Hoover. Is he still the actual head?

Dr. KELLOGG. Yes; he has been from the beginning and is now chairman of the American Relief Administration.

Mr. CONNALLY. How long were you in Russia?

Dr. KELLOGG. One month.

Mr. CONNALLY. Were you an official of the American Relief Administration?

Dr. KELLOGG. I have been associated with it from its beginning.

Mr. CONNALLY. You went to Russia for what reason?

Dr. KELLOGG. To make a special investigation of the food situation.

Mr. CONNALLY. There are 75 Americans over there?

Dr. KELLOGG. There are 75 Americans in our Russian unit.

Mr. CONNALLY. Have you had any reports from them as to the condition that existed?

Dr. KELLOGG. Yes; there was a very small group at the time I went over—10 or 12—since then it has grown.

Mr. CONNALLY. Was there any report from there that accelerated the trip or caused the special investigation?

Dr. KELLOGG. It was simply that these men are not coming back at present, and it was thought that some one should go and bring a report in person.

Mr. CONNALLY. That is what I was getting at.

Dr. KELLOGG. Some one who had a little experience in such matters.

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke of camps along the Volga, mentioning one in which you estimated 20,000 people.

Dr. KELLOGG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What shelter did those people have, if any?

Dr. KELLOGG. They had branches and some pieces of wood and cloth on the windward side. Many of them were without shelter.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the food?

Dr. KELLOGG. They had some little millet cakes and some buckwheat cakes, and had horsemeat. In their simplicity they expected to be carried away promptly into a land of food and plenty. Many of the people had been six weeks in the camp. The soviet Government finally brought in a lot of freight cars, and those freight cars waited some time for locomotives, but finally carried them out. But many of them died on the long trip.

Mr. SARATH. You say cakes. What kind of cakes?

Dr. KELLOGG. Something like a thick pancake.

Mr. SARATH. What was it made of?

Dr. KELLOGG. Millet and buckwheat and some other stuff.

Mr. COCKRAN. You spoke of distribution. What is the distribution plan?

Dr. KELLOGG. I think there was very little plan for distributing these refugees. They were just carried off into regions of less food shortage.

Mr. COCKRAN. Was the transportation furnished by the Government?

Dr. KELLOGG. By the Government. They started them for Siberia and Turkestan and the northern Provinces.

Mr. COCKRAN. Have they no special provision to take care of them in the places they are taken to?

Dr. KELLOGG. No more than there was special provision for the French when they were evacuated into Belgium by the Germans.

Mr. BURTON. One practical question, Dr. Kellogg: In a resolution granting \$800,000 for the relief of the sufferers from the earthquake at Messina, there was a provision that the concurrence or cooperation of the Italian Government should be sought by our Government.

Dr. KELLOGG. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Would you regard in any resolution that a provision of that kind be inserted here? I am asking it with a view to the form of a resolution, which we might draw, presuming that we report this favorably?

Dr. KELLOGG. I might answer that indirectly by saying that there is now an arrangement between the relief administration and the soviet Government

by which the government furnishes the transportation, pays all internal expenses, furnishes warehouses and guards; all that is being done by the Government.

Mr. BURTON. Is that a convention with our Government or with the relief association?

Mr. MOORE. I think that should be brought out in executive session with Dr. Kellogg and Gov. Goodrich.

The CHAIRMAN. We will hear Secretary Hoover now.

STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT C. HOOVER, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE.

Mr. HOOVER. I think perhaps, the committee would like to know something of the relief administration. The American Relief Administration was created during the armistice for the purpose of administering famine relief in various parts of Europe through funds provided to public charity by our Government and by other Governments. Its personnel has always been of volunteer character, many of them from its predecessor, the Belgian Relief Commission, therefore having had a large experience in famine relief. I presume at one time or another that the relief administration and its predecessor have administered relief to upward of 250 millions of people. After the armistice and with the passing of the food crises in 1919 the organization continued in relief of orphan, waif, and undernourished children throughout Europe. In the autumn of 1920 this organization combined with the other great American charities in a public appeal and collected some 30 millions of dollars for purposes of caring for the 3,500,000 children then remaining in its charge. After the completion of that drive the price of commodities fell very rapidly and beyond that the various Governments of Europe found themselves able to contribute a larger proportion of the cost of the many thousand institutions set up by the organization, and in consequence the administration had available this fall about \$12,000,000. The work in the rest of Europe was being rapidly wound up with the arrival of last harvest and with the ability of various Governments to take over fully support of these institutions for children.

During one time or another this association had provided out of charity for upward of 8,000,000 children. These children were gathered into great numbers of homes, canteens, and asylums, created by the administration (in fact, over 20,000 of them), and as the various Governments grew stronger and as local resources increased these establishments have been transferred to the responsibility of local authorities. To-day outside of Russia the administration has about four or five thousand children left on its hands in Poland and Austria, of which about 85 per cent of the cost is borne by local Governments or local charity. Thus we were in position to make an effort in Russia and with the full approval of our Government the relief administration opened negotiations last August with the Soviet authorities, acting as a voluntary and informal body.

Mr. CONNALLY. Did I understand you to say with the approval of the administration? What did you mean by that?

Mr. HOOVER. Our Government warmly approved of American private charity entering into Russia for relief purposes in connection with this famine. We had a long and difficult negotiation with the Soviet authorities, the initial requirement being the release of all American prisoners from Russia. That was secured and an agreement drawn up providing for the independence of this administration from any interference by the Soviet authorities. It provides a large amount of machinery by which the Soviet Government furnishes all transportation expenses and all expenditures inside of Russia. The relief administration spends not a penny in Russia except the personal expense allowances given to its staff.

The organization is headed in Europe by Mr. Walter Lyman Brown and in Russia under the leadership of Col. Haskell, of the American Army, and about one-half of the officers are men of the American Army and about one-half of the men had experience with famine in other countries.

This organization has been in action for over two months, and is now feeding about 1,000,000 children, and has fully established two matters: First, that it is possible to secure cooperation from the Soviet authorities; and, second, that this food can be distributed at American hands without interference or loss.

In undertaking the work the first thing to be established was the amount of the necessity. I therefore asked Dr. Kellogg, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Gregg, and,

finally, ex-Gov. Goodrich to independently examine the situation in the Volga Valley. These reports are all in agreement, as are also those of the men daily in the field.

The whole situation, I think, may be generalized as follows: That Russia, with something like 140,000,000 people under the sway of the Soviet government, has been steadily degenerating in agriculture and production ever since the establishment of the socialist government. The surpluses that the Russian people formerly produced have disappeared, and outside of the Volga Valley there is pretty generally a shortage in food, except in parts of the Ukraine and parts of Siberia. In the Volga Valley, with a population, as Gov. Goodrich said, of something like 15,000,000 to 18,000,000 people, there has been on top of this general decadence an extremely acute drought.

The problem that we are confronting is not a problem of general relief to Russia, for which there can be some criticism, but is a problem of relief to an area suffering from an acute drought. In other words, we are making a distinction here between the situation created by the hand of man as distinguished from the situation that might be called an act of God. This Volga area, as has been stated, is practically altogether an agricultural region. It has not been the scene of any extended socialist organization, as that is a city phenomena. It comprises a population of farmers, of which apparently one-third are of German extraction. If you will recollect, at the time of Catherine the Great large colonization was established in Russia from Germany. Those German colonists have grown largely in numbers and have furnished the basis of considerable immigration to the United States. I think you will find in Nebraska alone many thousands of farmers who migrated from the Volga Valley. You will find many thousands of farmers in the Northwest of the same population.

The actual requirements of a situation or any situation of this kind are very difficult to judge. The neck of the bottle, I believe, will be transportation. Transportation in Russia is not as difficult as we had originally anticipated, not because of Russia having such a vast amount of rolling stock left but because the movement of commodities has almost ceased; but, taking the probable capacity of the railways from the two ports that are available, I imagine that if we secured full cooperation and every exertion we should be limited to approximately 100,000 tons a month. If we are able to start at an early date we would have six months.

The CHAIRMAN. What are those two points?

Secretary HOOVER. We can probably go in at Novorossinsk, which is to the south, and Riga at the north.

So the probable maximum of food that could be transported is from 20,000,000 to 22,000,000 bushels, no matter what the requirements might be. All of the estimates call for something in excess of that amount, but experience now over a good many years has demonstrated that when we come to the practical problem of keeping a human being barely alive we can get along with a much less quantity than is calculated. I agree with the amount of 5,000,000 bushels seed wheat, as the governor said, but, as I stated, there is a maximum here from the point of view of transportation.

Mr. LINDBERGER. Do you consider that twenty to twenty-two million bushels of corn would be as effective as 5,000,000 bushels of seed grain?

Secretary HOOVER. The amount of seed grain can be approached in another fashion from that with which my colleague approached it in that if we assume the full crop already planted will yield one-fifth of the normal crop, then if we could provide another one-fifth of normal through sowing spring wheat, I believe the population would probably get through the succeeding year because this region normally produces a considerable surplus.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. How much would provide one-fifth or normal, of seed wheat? Secretary HOOVER. There is some division among our various investigators. I believe 3,000,000 of seed might get us through. We can use some corn in substitution, but you can take it that the estimate of 5,000,000 is certainly needed.

There is one phase of the problem that has not been touched on, and that is the children. The Relief Administration is now from its resources able to care for 1,200,000 children until next September. The children require more than grain. They require especially condensed milk, and if our estimates are true there are probably 3,000,000 or 3,500,000 of children that will need care. We, therefore, do urgently need some condensed milk.

The CHAIRMAN. What are your estimates of that?

Secretary HOOVER. If we had ability to do so, we would certainly purchase at least 500,000 cases of condensed milk at, say, \$4 a case.

Mr. COCKRAN. \$2,000,000.

Secretary HOOVER. I feel that public charity will do everything that charity can do, but these are times when one can not rightly summon much public charity for use abroad from the American people. There are a great many committees working throughout the country under great difficulty, but with a great deal of energy. I do not believe, however, that the total collections since August of the entire group amount to \$750,000. Public charity is to be not an avenue through which this problem can be solved.

Some question has been raised in here and elsewhere as to our own economic situation not warranting our extending relief abroad. I would like to discuss it from two points of view. The first is whether we can afford it. In a general way this country is spending something like \$1,000,000,000 a year on tobacco, cosmetics, ice cream, and other nonessentials of that character. It does not look to be a very great strain on the population to take \$20,000,000 for a purpose of this kind. If our own people suffer, we surely possess also the resources to care for them. It has also another economic bearing. The food supplies that we wish to take to Russia are all in surplus in the United States, and are without a market in any quarter of the globe.

[We are to-day feeding milk to our hogs; burning corn under our boilers. From an economic point of view there is no loss to America in exporting those foodstuffs for relief purposes. If it is undertaken by the Government it means, it is true, that we transfer the burden of the loss from the farmers to the taxpayer, but there is now economic loss to us as a Nation, and the farmer also bears part of the burden.]

Mr. LINDBERGER. It would relieve a glutted market to a certain extent.

Secretary HOOVER. If we are able to go into the market and buy a substantial quantity of corn we may give some relief to the American farmer in disposing of his surplus.

Mr. CONNALLY. Let us not dilute our generosity with any selfish purposes. Is it a fact that it would have an appreciable effect, or affect the market on corn? Let us not put it on the basis of helping ourselves by giving away the \$20,000,000 to Russia.

Secretary HOOVER. I have a feeling we are dealing to-day with a situation of a great deal of depression and have a proper right to inquire not only whether we are doing an act of great humanity, but whether we are doing an act of economic soundness? To me, after assessing our ability to give, no other argument is needed beyond the sheer humanity. There was just one remark of Gov. Goodrich's that might cause a misapprehension, that fresh mutton could be obtained at 3 cents a pound on the Volga. Three cents over there is 3,000 rubles. The monthly wage of workers is 4,000 rubles on the Volga. Therefore, even at the supposed ridiculous prices of the food supply, there is, on that basis, less than one meal for a month's wages at the present time.

If there are any questions that I can answer I shall be very glad to do so. The various reports of the Relief Administration will be put into the record. I do not need to trouble you with those.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have any exhibits that you feel should be a part of the record, I wish you would kindly leave them with the committee.

Mr. CONNALLY. One question about the volume of exports of grain now from this country to Russia. Are any exports now taking place?

Secretary HOOVER. There are apparently somewhere in the neighborhood of one and a half to two million bushels of wheat that has moved to Russia purchased with soviet gold.

Mr. CONNALLY. Covering what period of time?

Secretary HOOVER. Since last August.

Mr. CONNALLY. Twenty million dollars of the fund raised on this basis.

Secretary HOOVER. That is being applied now.

Mr. CONNALLY. When you calculate the amount necessary you assume, of course, the expenditure of this part?

Secretary HOOVER. Yes, sir. There is one thing I should like to mention that I forgot. That is that the Relief Administration is a voluntary body, and I would like to make a suggestion to you that reference to any particular organization be left in the hands of the President. I would not try to legislate for a voluntary body, although I have no doubt the organization will go on.

Mr. COCKRAN. You spoke of independent examinations. I understand that each of these gentlemen who testified here pursued an entirely independent investigation of his own?

Secretary HOOVER. Yes; they were there over entirely different periods. Mr. COCKRAN. So that their particular views are gathered from entirely independent observation?

Secretary HOOVER. Gov. Goodrich and Dr. Kellogg were the only two Americans who have had actual experience in this region who have returned.

Mr. COCKRAN. One more question. You spoke of the means of transportation as the limit of our capacity to furnish relief. You did not speak of the rivers. Would not the rivers afford any means of transportation?

Secretary HOOVER. The rivers are frozen.

Mr. COCKRAN. How about in the southern part?

Secretary HOOVER. The difficulty is in access from the Caspian Sea. They would probably have to use the railroads to reach the Volga and they are in demoralized condition.

Mr. COCKRAN. Then they would have to depend upon the railways considerably?

Secretary HOOVER. Until some time in April. One word more and that is about overhead expenses. I will be very glad for the Relief Administration to pay the entire overhead expenditures of this operation in order that the appropriation may be used entirely for the purpose of grain and of transportation.

Mr. SARATH. What do you mean by that?

Secretary HOOVER. I as chairman of the Relief Administration think that they should undertake to do the entire administration of it without charge on the Government.

Mr. SARATH. That would leave the appropriation for food to relieve the necessities of those people.

Mr. CONNALLY. The bill does not authorize expenditures for overhead. It says, for delivering food to the administration.

Secretary HOOVER. There will be some overhead in the purchase. The Relief Administration is made up of volunteers. I have no doubt those men will volunteer their services in this matter.

Mr. CONNALLY. Do you agree with the estimate of Gov. Goodrich and Dr. Kellogg that \$20,000,000 would cover the needs and relieve the necessities of the situation? Do you think it would need about that amount?

Secretary HOOVER. Twenty million dollars will cover all that we can physically do, and, I believe, that the situation requires.

Mr. FAIRCHILD. Would you want \$2,000,000 additional for condensed milk?

Secretary HOOVER. We include that in the \$20,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. BURTON. In speaking of the valley of the Volga, do you refer to from Zharestan down or just from Kazan down?

Secretary HOOVER. I think it extends north, and from Kazan down to the mouth of the Volga.

Mr. BURTON. Not far north of Kazan.

Secretary HOOVER. Not far north of Kazan.

Mr. BURTON. In that region there is a road 502 miles long that was under private control and supplies were shipped over it without great expense.

Secretary HOOVER. Until recently that railroad had not been restored from the results of the Wrangel invasion. I imagine that at an early date we will be able to get some transportation through.

STATEMENT OF SAMUEL GOMPERS, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR.

Mr. GOMPERS. There is little or nothing that I may add to what has already been submitted to you by Gov. Goodrich, Dr. Kellogg, and by Mr. Hoover. I have no facts which contravene or modify any of the statements made to you. I do not wish to encumber the record with any statements that are probably cumulative or unnecessary. All that I wish to say is that in my judgment the appeal is founded upon a real dire necessity. It has already been stated and I think that every man who has had to deal with matters of appeals to the public for contributions almost for any cause in the past six months or a year has come to the conclusion that it is little more than vain. When a call of this kind comes to us as a people in our Republic and when we find the situation as it is, due to causes which it is not necessary to explain other than to say that the people have contributed very largely from generosity to every

cause, every call for the purpose of humanity, there is only one resort left, and that is to appeal to the Government of the United States to come to the relief of a sorrowing, stricken people. It is quite apropos for Mr. Hoover in his statement to you gentlemen this afternoon to say that the distinction has been made between what might be termed the act or the hand of God and that which is due to the added hand of man.

I think you know the position which I have taken with regard to Russia, and I say I have taken it on my own initiative as well as later with the approval and the indorsement of my associates in the cause of labor. Having been devotedly in hearty accord with the revolution in Russia which overthrew the Czar and czarism, having given all the encouragement and aid which a private citizen could in this great work for the reconstruction of Russia and the Russian people, consternation came to every right-thinking, liberty-loving man living in democratic countries when the real constructive revolutionary movement took place in Russia and then was installed instead of a constructive, progressive, and civilizing government that made Russia from the old autocracy into a seeming democracy, but which established the greatest autocracy existing in any civilized country on the face of the globe. I could not nor could my associates tolerate such a condition of affairs. At least if we could not antagonize it we could not give it our support, our moral support, our financial support. As men associated with a large group of American people, we stand for the proposition of progress, and as we are opposed to the dictatorship of any man or any group, call it by any name, imperialist, if you please, we are just as much opposed to an autocracy or a dictatorship of the so-called proletariat. What I wanted to be sure about before I expressed a word in favor of this legislation now pending here before the committee is that I wanted to know whether if the American Congress shall out of the pockets of the people expend \$10,000,000 or \$20,000,000 for the relief of the famine-stricken people of Russia, whether it would give aid and comfort to the present Government of Russia, and I wanted to know whether they would be in absolute control of this fund and this relief by the American Relief Administration, that it would not be taken over to help the existing régime in Russia called the soviet government, and whether it would tranquilize the people to such an extent as that they would help the present régime as final.

Mr. CONNALLY. You heard the testimony of this gentleman that on the other hand, this government, instead of being a government of vultures, was aiding and helping to distribute this food, and it actually made contributions to other Provinces. Does that disabuse your mind of any impression that there would be any confiscation of that property by the government?

Mr. GOMPERS. I made the statement that I have just made to explain the position which I occupy and think my mind was disabused before I came here this afternoon. I came here to add my appeal to that which has already been made before this committee. I want that your committee shall know, and I want that those whom I had the honor in part to represent to know, that I am here expressing their views and having been satisfied with the appropriation by the Government of funds for the purpose of this relief, in as far as I can add anything I shall be very pleased to appeal to you to pass this legislation.

(Thereupon, at 4.40 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned to meet again at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Wednesday, December 14, 1921.)

RIGA AGREEMENT.

The Council of People's Commissaries of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic hereby authorizes the Assistant commissary for foreign affairs, Citizen M. M. Litvinov, to negotiate with the American Relief Administration and also with other relief organizations and committees aiming to render relief to the famine-stricken population; to sign in the name of the Council of the People's Commissaries all agreements that may be entered into with the above-mentioned organizations; and to accept and incur obligations which he may deem necessary and advisable.

In testimony whereof this plenipotentiary power is given to him and the seal of the Council of People's Commissaries is hereto affixed.

(Signed) **KD. LENIN,**

*President of the Council of People's Commissaries,
President of the All Russian Central Executive Committee.*

(Signed) **GEORGE THURTELL,**

People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs.

RIGA AGREEMENT.

Whereas a famine condition exists in parts of Russia; and

Whereas Mr. Maxim Gorky, with the knowledge of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, has appealed through Mr. Hoover to the American people for assistance to the starving and sick people, more particularly the children, of the famine-stricken parts of Russia; and

Whereas Mr. Hoover and the American people have read with great sympathy this appeal on the part of the Russian people in their distress and are desirous, solely for humanitarian reasons, of coming to their assistance, and

Whereas Mr. Hoover, in his reply to Mr. Gorky, has suggested that supplementary relief might be brought by the American Relief Administration to up to 1,000,000 children in Russia; Therefore

It is agreed between the American Relief Administration, an unofficial volunteer American charitable organization under the chairmanship of Mr. Herbert Hoover hereinafter called the A. R. A., and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, hereinafter called the soviet authorities.

That the A. R. A. will extend such assistance to the Russian people as is within its power, subject to the acceptance and fulfillment of the following conditions on the part of the soviet authorities, who hereby declare that there is need of this assistance on the part of the A. R. A.

The soviet authorities agree:

1. That the A. R. A. may bring into Russia such personnel as the A. R. A. finds necessary in the carrying out of its work and the soviet authorities guarantee them full liberty and protection while in Russia. Non-Americans and Americans who have been detained in Soviet Russia since 1917 will be admitted on approval by the soviet authorities.

2. That they will, on demand of the A. R. A., immediately extend all facilities for the entry into and exit from Russia of the personnel mentioned in (1) and while such personnel are in Russia the soviet authorities shall accord them full liberty to come and go and move about Russia on official business and shall provide them with all necessary papers such as safe-conducts, laissez passer, etc., to facilitate their travel.

3. That in securing Russian and other local personnel the A. R. A. shall have complete freedom as to selection and the soviet authorities will, on request, assist the A. R. A. in securing same.

4. That on delivery by the A. R. A. of its relief supplies at the Russian ports of Petrograd, Murmansk, Archangel, Novorossisk, or other Russian ports as mutually agreed upon, or the nearest practicable available ports in adjacent countries, decision to lie with the A. R. A., the soviet authorities will bear all further costs such as discharge, handling, loading, and transportation to interior base points in the areas where the A. R. A. may operate. Should demurrage or storage occur at above ports mutually agreed upon as satisfactory such demurrage and storage is for the account of the soviet authorities. For purposes of this agreement the ports of Riga, Reval, Ligan, Hango, and Helsingfors are also considered satisfactory ports. Notice of at least five days will be given to soviet representatives at respective ports in case the soviet authorities are expected to take c. i. f. delivery.

5. That they will at their own expense supply the necessary storage at interior base points mentioned in paragraph (4) and handling and transportation for same to all such other interior points as the A. R. A. may designate.

6. That in all above storage and movement of relief supplies they will give the A. R. A. the same priority over all other traffic as the soviet authorities give their own relief supplies, and on demand of the A. R. A. will furnish adequate guards and convoys.

7. That they will give free import and reexport and guarantee freedom for requisition to all A. R. A. supplies of whatever nature. The A. R. A. will repay the soviet authorities for expenses incurred by them on reexported supplies.

8. That the relief supplies are intended only for children and the sick, as designated by the A. R. A. in accordance with paragraph (24), and remain the property of the A. R. A. until actually consumed by these children and the sick, and are to be distributed in the name of the A. R. A.

9. That no individual receiving A. R. A. rations shall be deprived of such local supplies as are given to the rest of the population.

10. That they will guarantee and take every step to insure that relief supplies belonging to the A. R. A. will not go to the general adult population nor

to the army, navy, or government employees, but only to such persons as designated in paragraphs (8) and (24).

11. The soviet authorities undertake to reimburse the A. R. A. in dollars at c. i. f. cost or replace in kind any misused relief supplies.

12. That the A. R. A. shall be allowed to set up the necessary organizations for carrying out its relief work free from governmental or other interference. The central and local soviet authorities have the right of representative thereon.

13. That the soviet authorities will provide:

(a) The necessary premises for kitchens, dispensaries, and, in as far as possible, hospitals.

(b) The necessary fuel and, when available, cooking, distributing, and feeding equipment for the same.

(c) The total cost of local relief administration, food preparation, distribution, etc., themselves are in conjunction with local authorities. Mode of payment to be arranged at later date.

(d) On demand of the A. R. A. such local medical personnel and assistance, satisfactory to the A. R. A., as are needed to efficiently administer its relief.

(e) Without cost, railway, motor, water, or other transportation for movement of relief supplies, and of such personnel as may be necessary to efficiently control relief operations. The soviet authorities will, for the duration of the A. R. A. operations, assign to the A. R. A. for the sole use of its personnel and transport free of cost such railway carriages as the A. R. A. may reasonably request.

14. In localities where the A. R. A. may be operating, and where epidemics are raging, the A. R. A. shall be empowered by the soviet authorities to take such steps as may be necessary toward the improvement of sanitary conditions, protection of water supply, etc.

15. That they will supply free of charge the necessary offices, garages, storerooms, etc., for the transaction of the A. R. A. business, and when available, heat, light, and water for same. Further, that they will place at the disposal of the A. R. A. adequate residential quarters for the A. R. A. personnel in all localities where the A. R. A. may be operating. All such above premises to be free from seizure and requisition. Examination of above premises will not be made except with knowledge and in presence of the chief of the A. R. A. operations in Russia, or his representative, and except in case of flagrant delict, when examiner will be held responsible in case examination unwarranted.

16. That they will give to the A. R. A. complete freedom and priority, without cost, in the use of existing radio, telegraph, telephone, cable, post, and couriers in Russia, and will provide the A. R. A., when available and subject to the consent of competent authorities, with private telegraph and telephone wires and maintenance free of cost.

17. To accord the A. R. A. and its American representatives and its couriers the customary diplomatic privileges as to passing the frontiers.

18. To supply the A. R. A., free of cost, with the necessary gasoline and oil to operate its motor transportation, and to transport such motor transportation by rail or otherwise as may be necessary.

19. To furnish, at the request of the competent A. R. A. authorities, all A. R. A. personnel, together with their impediments and supplies, free transportation in Russia.

20. To permit the A. R. A. to import and reexport free of duty and requisition such commissary, transport, and office supplies as are necessary for its personnel and administration.

21. That they will acquaint the Russian people with the aims and methods of the relief work of the A. R. A., in order to facilitate the rapid development of its efficiency and will assist and facilitate in supplying the American people with reliable and nonpolitical information of the existing conditions and the progress of the relief work as an aid in developing financial support in America.

22. That they will bear all expenses of the relief operation other than—

(a) Cost of relief supplies at port (see par. 4).

(b) Direct expenses of American control and supervision of relief work in Russia, with exceptions as above. In general, they will give the A. R. A. all assistance in their power toward the carrying out of its humanitarian relief operations.

The A. R. A. agrees:

23. Within the limits of its resources and facilities, to supply, as rapidly as suitable organization can be effected, food, clothing, and medical relief to the sick, and particularly to the children within the age limits as decided upon by the A. R. A.

24. That its relief distribution will be to the children and sick, without regard to race, religion, or social or political status.

25. That its personnel in Russia will confine themselves strictly to the administration of relief and will engage in no political or commercial activity whatever. In view of paragraph (1) and the freedom of American personnel in Russia from personal search, arrest, and detention, any personnel contravening this will be withdrawn or discharged on the request of the central soviet authorities. The central soviet authorities will submit to the chief officer of the A. R. A. the reasons for this request and the evidence in their possession.

26. That it will carry on its operations where it finds its relief can be administered most efficiently and to secure best results. Its principal object is to bring relief to the famine-stricken areas of the Volga.

27. That it will import no alcohol in its relief supplies and will permit customs inspection of its imported relief supplies at points to be mutually agreed upon.

The soviet authorities having previously agreed as the absolute *sine qua non* of any assistance on the part of the American people to release all Americans detained in Russia and to facilitate the departure from Russia of all Americans so desiring, the A. R. A. reserves to itself the right to suspend temporarily or terminate all of its relief work in Russia in case of failure on the part of the soviet authorities to fully comply with this primary condition or with any condition set forth in the above agreement. The soviet authorities equally reserve the right of canceling this agreement in case of nonfulfillment of any of the above clauses on the part of the A. R. A.

Made in Riga, August 20, 1921.

On behalf of council of peoples commissaries of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic:

MAXIM LITVINOV,

Assistant Peoples Commissary for Foreign Affairs.

On behalf of the American Relief Administration:

WALTER LYMAN BROWN,

Director for Europe.

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN RELIEF COUNCIL, HELD AT THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, WASHINGTON, D. C., WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 24, 1921, AT 9.30 A. M.

There were present at the meeting: James A. Norton, Rufus Jones, Wilbur K. Thomas, American Friends Service Committee; W. Frank Parsons, Elliot Wadsworth, George A. Sloan, American Red Cross; Herbert Hoover, Col. William N. Haskell, Julius H. Barnes, Edgar Rickard, American Relief Administration; E. O. Watson, James H. Franklin, Roy B. Guild, John Finley, Federal Council of Churches; Felix M. Warburg, Lewis L. Strauss, James N. Rosenberg, Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; P. J. Callahan, Knights of Columbus; Charles A. McMahon, National Catholic Welfare Council; C. V. Hibbard, Young Men's Christian Association; Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, Young Women's Christian Association.

1. Mr. Hoover, as chairman, opened the meeting with an outline (a) of the situation in Russia and (b) of the conditions under which the relief was to be undertaken.

It was decided that inasmuch as the whole problem was apparently beyond the resources of private charity, the work of the associations represented at this meeting would in its initial stages be directed in priority toward children and in medical supplies.

2. A summary of the agreement signed by the American Relief Administration and the soviet authorities at Riga was then presented to the meeting for their information, Mr. Hoover offering the benefits of said agreement to the other organizations comprising the council, should they desire to engage in the relief. (See Appendix A.)

3. After discussion of the part to be played in the relief by each of the associations comprising the European Relief Council and in settlement of the complete cooperation and coordination of the above associations, the following memorandum was agreed to by all:

(a) The agreement between the American Relief Administration and the soviet authorities at Riga is accepted by the associations affiliated in the European Relief Council and all activities will be according to this agreement.

(b) The Director of the American Relief Administration in Russia will assign to the American Friends Service Committee, which is now conducting relief work in Russia, a definite district or area of distribution, in which the American Friends Service Committee shall keep their own identity and work according to their own ideals, but always under the supervision of the Director of the American Relief Administration in Russia, pursuant to and in conformity with the terms of the Riga agreement.

(c) The Director of the American Relief Administration in Russia shall appoint on his staff at headquarters one or more representatives (to be mutually agreed) of any of the organization members of the European Relief Council. In turn the member organizations who may be represented in Russia agree to furnish such representatives. The object of this arrangement is to secure complete cooperation and coordination among the different organizations.

(d) Each of the distributing organizations is to conduct all relations with the central soviet authorities through or with the approval of the Director of the American Relief Administration in Russia.

(e) The Director of the American Relief Administration in Russia is to have the same authority over the personnel of all distributing organizations as incorporated in the Riga agreement.

(f) The relief is being furnished by the American people and the different distributing associations shall use appropriate words and means so to designate it.

(g) The associations in the United States shall be individually guided by their own views as to the collection of funds.

(h) It is understood that the purchasing, transportation, and warehouse facilities of the American Relief Administration, both inside and outside Russia, are open to each distributing organization at cost to the American Relief Administration.

4. It was decided that a further meeting of the council would be held as soon as representatives of the distributing organizations had had an opportunity for thorough survey of the situation in Russia.

5. There being no further business, upon motion duly made and seconded, the meeting was adjourned at 1 p. m.

CLARENCE C. STETSON,

Secretary of the Meeting.

APPENDIX A.

The following is a summary based on cables, and is therefore subject to possible change in details, no full copy of the actual agreement having been received.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION AND SOVIET AUTHORITIES RE RUSSIAN RELIEF—PREAMBLE.

Whereas famine condition exists in Russia; and

Whereas Gorky with sanction soviets has applied through Hoover to American people for charitable assistance to the starving and sick people of Russia, more particularly the children; and

Whereas Hoover and American people have read with great sympathy this appeal on the part Russian people in their distress and are desirous solely for humanitarian reasons of coming to their assistance;

Therefore it is agreed between American Relief Administration, unofficial volunteer American charitable organization under chairmanship of Hoover, hereinafter called American Relief Administration, and Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic called soviet authorities, that the American Relief Administration will extend such assistance to Russian people as within its power, subject acceptance and fulfillment following condition on part soviet authorities who hereby declare that there is need of this assistance on part of American Relief Administration.

1. The soviets agree that the American Relief Administration may bring in such personnel as it thinks necessary for the efficient administration of relief, and that it be assured of full liberty and protection in Russia. Non-Americans and Americans detained in Soviet Russia since 1917 are to be subject to the approval of the soviet authorities.

2. The relief administration personnel shall have all facilities for entry to and exit from Russia and liberty of movement therein on official business.

3. The relief administration shall have complete freedom in the selection of local personnel.

4. It shall deliver supplies at a Russian port or the nearest practical adjacent point, and the soviet authorities are to bear all further charges for the same.

5. The soviet will supply storage base points and the transportation needed for supplies.

6. The soviets will give the Relief Administration the same priority in this as that accorded to own relief and will furnish adequate guards for convoys, etc.

7. The soviets will allow the free import and reexport of all relief administration supplies whatever and will guarantee them against requisition.

8. Relief supplies are to be devoted to the sick and children only as designated by the relief administration, and are to remain the property of the administration until consumed. The distribution is to be in the name of the administration.

9. No individual receiving relief-administration rations is to be deprived of a share of such local supplies as are given to the rest of the population by soviet agencies.

10. The soviet guarantee to take steps to insure that supplies do not go to the general population, the army, navy, or government employees, but only as designated by the relief administration.

11. The soviets undertake to reimburse in American dollars or replace in kind any supplies that are misused.

12. The relief administration may set up necessary organizations for relief free from Government or other interference. The central and local soviet authorities have the right of representation therein.

13. The soviet authorities are to provide necessary premises for kitchens, dispensaries, and, as far as possible, hospitals and necessary fuel for cooking in the same, and the distribution and feeding equipments. The soviets will bear the total cost of local relief administration, food preparation, distribution, etc., and of local medical personnel and assistance needed to administer relief. They will give free rail, motor, and water transportation for the movement of relief supplies, and such personnel as is necessary efficiently to control the relief operations. They will assign railroad cars to the relief personnel for moving, living, etc.

14. The relief administration is authorized to take such measures as are necessary to insure sanitary conditions, water supply, etc., in the area where epidemics are raging.

15. The soviets will supply offices, garages, and storerooms free of charge, with light, heat, and water for the same, and residential quarters for the personnel, all free from requisition. Examination of all or any of said premises can only be made with the knowledge of and in the presence of the chief of relief operations or his representative, and then in case of a so-called flagrant delit.

16. The soviets guarantee the freedom and priority of the relief administration communications, without cost, by means of the existing radio, telegraph, telephone, postal, and courier services, and, if available, the use of private telephones and telegraphs will be permitted for the relief administration's use (subject to consent of the authorities).

17. The American personnel, representatives, and couriers will receive the customary diplomatic privileges at the frontiers.

18. The soviets will supply free of cost gasoline oil for motor transport.

19. The soviets will give baggage and supplies free transportation.

20. The soviets will allow the importation and reexport, free of duty (requisition), of the necessary commissary (transport and office) supplies.

21. The soviets will acquaint the Russian people with the aims and methods of the American Relief Association work to facilitate rapid development of its efficiency and will assist and facilitate supplying the American people with reliable and nonpolitical information as to the existing conditions and the progress of the relief work as an aid in the development of financial support for the work in America.

22. The soviets will bear all the expenses of relief operations other than the cost of relief supplies and the direct expenses of the American control and

payment of the American personnel, and in general will give the relief administration all the assistance in their power.

23. (Note.—Deals with questions of warehousing, which are to be settled later.)

24. The American Relief Administration agrees to organize as quickly as possible, within the limits of its resources, to supply food, clothing, and medical help, particularly to children and sick persons within age limits to be decided by American Relief Administration.

25. Relief is to be distributed without regard to race, religion, social, or political status.

26. The personnel in Russia will confine itself strictly to the administration of relief and will engage in no political or commercial activities whatever. Any person contravening this engagement shall be withdrawn or discharged on the request of the central soviet authorities. The central soviet authorities will submit to the chief office of the American Relief Administration the reasons for this request and the evidence in their possession.

27. The American Relief Administration will carry on relief operations where it finds relief can be administered most effectively and will secure the best results. Its principal object is to bring relief to the famine-stricken areas.

28. (Missing.)

29. The relief administration will import no alcohol in its relief supplies.

30. The American Relief Administration will agree to permit customs inspection of its imported relief supplies at mutually agreed upon points.

CANCELLATION CLAUSES.

The soviet authorities having agreed to release all Americans detained in Russia and facilitate the departure from Russia of all Americans so desiring, the relief administration reserves the right to suspend temporarily or terminate relief operations in Russia in the event of failure by the soviet authorities to comply with this primary condition or any other points of the contract. The soviet authorities equally reserve the right to cancel the agreement in the case of nonfulfillment by the American Relief Administration.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Wednesday, December 14, 1921.

The committee this day met, Hon. Henry W. Temple presiding.

Mr. TEMPLE. The committee will be in order. We adjourned yesterday to meet again this morning for further consideration of House bill 9439. The committee will now hear Mr. Snyder.

STATEMENT OF MR. RALPH SNYDER, MANHATTAN, KANS.

Mr. SNYDER. I represent the American Farm Bureau Federation as one of the executive board. I will occupy just a few moments. I take it that enough testimony has been given as to the need for this move, and further than that I could give nothing but second-hand information along that line at best. I just want to speak for the American Farm Bureau Federation, and I feel that I can speak of what I am going to say for the farmers of the corn belt, and, for that matter, of the entire United States, because I believe I know their sentiments in this matter. We feel, of course, that there is need. Nobody questions, I think, that there is need of relief to the starving farmers of Russia. That has been well demonstrated.

The question is as to how this relief should come. Heretofore, relief of this kind has been largely by voluntary subscriptions. We feel that in normal times that would probably be adequate and possibly the best yet, but under present conditions we farmers feel that this relief would best be distributed over the entire United States. We have an abundance of grain, and, especially of corn, and I think it has been stated that \$1 worth of corn under present conditions will go about as far as \$3 worth of any other grain, and it seems it will sustain life quite largely over in that section, if enough of it is sent over.

We want you to understand that we are looking at this from the broad humanitarian standpoint only, and that we feel that some such relief as this is,

as I said, absolutely necessary. We realize, of course, it is going to add something to our taxes, but we are willing to bear our fair share of that. As I said, I think that in ordinary times those who have an abundance of this corn as we have in the corn section of the United States, would gladly contribute it. Under present conditions we feel that it should be spread more broadly over the entire United States, the entire people. I have a telegram from the governor of Nebraska that I would like to read, sent to our headquarters, of the American Farm Bureau Federation, in care of our Washington representative, as follows:

"Bill pending before House Foreign Relations Committee to appropriate money to purchase 10,000,000 bushels of corn for famine-stricken Russia. Seems commendable and worthy of support of Nebraska Congressmen, and of other States for the great surplus of corn, where it can help out."

I know that I can speak for my own State of Kansas as indorsing this proposition, as has Nebraska. I know as well that I can speak for the entire farming population as represented by the American Farm Bureau, and I feel that I can speak as well this sentiment for the entire farming population of the United States. I feel, more than that, that our farmers think that while we are about it we might just as well make a thoroughly good job of this proposition.

I am not going to take any more of your time, but would just say this, that in addition to sustaining life of the farmers and putting them on their feet so that they may make their own way another year in production, it appeals to him that the children of that section are worthy of consideration, further than simply the grain proposition. I believe, if I understand the diet of children at all, that they are going to have something more than grain to sustain life and carry them through until more food can be produced. I believe that a sufficient appropriation should be made and it should be broad enough so that sufficient milk could be sent over to that country to carry those children through, because we all know that that will be absolutely necessary. That is all I have to say.

Mr. TEMPLE. May I ask what arrangements were made a year or more ago to raise contributions of grain for the Near East sufferers?

Mr. SNYDER. The matter has been working in our section until just recently, and I think, is still to some extent.

Mr. TEMPLE. Was that a voluntary contribution?

Mr. SNYDER. That was voluntary contribution. I was traveling with Mr. Voorhes, the chairman of the Near East Relief Committee in this country, just a day or so ago, and I do not remember just his figures, but he showed us very plainly his overhead expense in making this collection was so great that they were abandoning it. They were not trying to make any more collections that way, and I know from my personal knowledge in Kansas that is the case. One man working on that told me a month ago that he was going to quit because, he said, "I have not the conscience to take the money." He was not getting much, about \$10 a day for his work, possibly a little less, but he said he could not take the money any longer and was going to quit.

Mr. BURTON. Can you give us any estimate of the value of grain contributed by the farmers for the relief?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I have not those figures.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that we have heard appeals for relief, and I think we have sufficient information so that we can get right down to business here and have Secretary Hoover, Gov. Goodrich, and Prof. Kellogg remain with us for advice, but I do not think there is any necessity for further hearings.

Mr. COCKRAN. There is no contradiction of it.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one more witness, Mr. Vrooman.

STATEMENT OF MR. CARL VROOMAN.

Mr. VROOMAN. I was asked by the president of the Farm Bureau to appear here. I was a director of the corn movement of the American Farm Bureau Federation last spring, and I understand that is the reason Mr. Howard asked me to be here.

Mr. TEMPLE. What is your present position?

Mr. VROOMAN. Farmer. I am a farmer, a very unprofitable position.

Mr. MOORES. Are you the Vrooman who was with the Department of Agriculture as Assistant Secretary.

Mr. VROOMAN. Yes, sir. The point I wanted to make, as I have not heard the testimony of my colleague, is that the interest of the farmer in this movement is primarily humanitarian. I think this is very clearly indicated by the gift-corn movement, to which I referred a moment ago. Last winter the American Farm Bureau Federation took the matter up with Mr. Hoover and the other committees that were endeavoring to alleviate the sufferings of the starving people of Europe, and said that the farmers would be very glad to contribute corn to these people. It took nearly the winter for the negotiations to be carried out, so that the farmers did not go to work on the proposition.

Mr. COCKRAN. Negotiations with whom?

Mr. VROOMAN. With all these different relief associations, and with the railroads, with the millers, with the elevator men, because this was gift project. The farmers gave grain, the elevators handled the grain, the railroads furnished transportation free. Everybody did everything free, and the corn we have got over there was worth ten times as much as when it left the farmers' hands, and it had been given. The elevator gave its service free, the railroads the transportation free, and the Chicago Board of Trade removed certain charges for inspection and weighing and all that sort of thing, and as it went along it was like a snowball. In the shape of hominy grits and so forth it was worth ten times as much as when it left the farmers' hands. The farmers would have given vastly more than this if able to haul the grain on good roads instead of rough, muddy roads in the spring, and also they have to haul the corn in the spring, when they have enough work, and their harvests in the fall. There were 700,000 bushels of corn raised in that corn-gift movement in that way.

As Mr. Gompers said yesterday, whenever the State Department decided that we would not be bolstering up that régime in Russia, it would be vastly more a thousand times as much to show the feeling of traditional friendship of America for the Russian people.

The farmers are more than delighted to be able to make their contributions in this way; but, as I say, their motives are primarily humanitarian. Of course, as has been said here, there is a secondary result. In addition to saving the lives of starving people in Russia, there will be a comeback—bread cast on the waters has always had a tendency to come back to the giver. It is an old story. This gift-corn movement of the farmers of 700,000 bushels of grain scattered over Europe has resulted in over 10,000,000 bushels being used already. They have learned to use it. The result has been almost magical. They have learned that the grits are as good as rice and cost them less. It does not cost half as much. The Department of Commerce has given figures, we have sold tens of millions of bushels more than we have sold during recent years.

This possibly will have that sort of effect. It also will have the effect intimated yesterday by Mr. Fordney of having a slight tendency to raise the price of corn.

Mr. CONNALLY. You do not urge that as a reason for this measure?

Mr. VROOMAN. That is a side issue mentioned by Mr. Fordney. I am giving the farmers' point of view.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not think anything of it at all. I can not see how getting rid of \$10,000,000 worth of grain will make us any richer. That is an insignificant immaterial consideration in this bill.

Mr. VROOMAN. I do not want to take too much time. I will say just this. This surplus corn is a liability, not an asset. There is no domestic demand. It is a liability like undigested food in the stomach. Five per cent of the farmers' corn is surplus food. It is not only a liability, but it is bringing the price down of the other 95 per cent of the corn and other farm products five times as much this year will.

Mr. CONNALLY. Do you think it would be wise to destroy it?

Mr. VROOMAN. No; give it to those people. We are taking one step in the right direction. It is not a large step, but still it will be in that direction. That is not the point I am making. That has been brought in by other people.

The point I make is that the creeping paralysis that struck the farmer last year is now spreading in the business world. Out in my section of the West the business men are now as anxious as the farmers. It will hit them later, as it has my farm, unless something is done to get rid of not only 20,000,000 bushels, but of the large surplus that the farmers have produced. The busi-

ness world will be worse off in a year than the farmers are to-day, because the farmers can eat or burn their corn. When the business man makes money he makes it faster than does the farmer, and he loses money faster when he loses money.

There is a selfish benefit that accrues from this generous act, it is true. It is a side issue and incidental, and any benefit that accrues to the farmer will accrue to the whole country and the business men will get as much benefit as we.

Mr. SABATH. And the country at large.

Mr. VROOMAN. The country at large will get it. The farmer has no selfish interest in this proposition any greater than any other taxpayer in the United States.

I think that is all I have to say unless you have questions to ask.

Mr. BURTON. Now Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we go into executive session with Secretary Hoover, Gov. Goodrich, and Dr. Kellogg.

(Thereupon, at 11 o'clock a. m., the committee went into executive session and thereafter adjourned.)

MSH A 22058

**END OF
TITLE**